tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-61777653675200625992024-03-08T06:23:53.528-08:00Social Problems Are Like MathsAveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.comBlogger83125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-10651296877975790822014-05-21T05:54:00.001-07:002014-05-21T05:56:01.165-07:00UKIP or the Greens: Who are really saying the unsayable?<br />
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Amidst their <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/05/17/ukip-placed-in-first-and-third-place_n_5344718.html">recent popularity</a>, the United Kingdom Independence Party has tried to encourage the perception that they stand outside the established political consensus, offering arguments and perspectives neglected by mainstream political debate. This of course, is at odds with the fact that support for most UKIP policies can be found in the mainstream rightwing press every week. There is nothing daring about talking about exiting the EU, or transgressive about plotting to reduce immigration. UKIP might have other radical concerns or proposals, but they certainly haven’t told anybody yet: Nigel Farage disowned his 2010 General Election manifesto, and has <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/20/ukip-manifesto-europe-immigration">failed to disclose</a> any updated domestic policies. It’s only with his <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27474099">recent comments on Romanians</a> that Farage has said anything genuinely controversial, and he has <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/05/19/farage-ukip-tired_n_5349828.html">expressed ambivalence</a> since.<br />
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By contrast to UKIP’s <a href="http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/themes/5308a93901925b5b09000002/attachments/original/1397750311/localmanifesto2014.pdf?1397750311">flimsy</a> policy platform, it is the Green Party, the other lot outside the mainstream party system, who have genuinely consensus shaking ideas. To take a few examples:</div>
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On <u>Migration</u> (note that it is ‘migration’, rather than immigration; not just an issue of coming, but leaving), the Greens <a href="http://policy.greenparty.org.uk/mg.html">turn the standard debate</a> on its head, challenging the assumption that rich countries have a right to exclude foreigners, and framing the debate around <u>global inequality</u>, rather than the economic self-interest of the UK</div>
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On <u>Economic Inequality</u>, the Greens argue for a <a href="http://policy.greenparty.org.uk/ec.html"><u>Citizens’ Income</u></a>, an unconditional sum of money for all citizens to prevent destitution and allow them a degree of freedom from the pressing imperative for a job and income, allowing them to develop their education, family life etc. This is a radical policy with <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_income#Advocacy">prominent historic advocates</a> on the left and the right, yet one which is unknown to most Britons today</div>
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On <u>International Trade</u>, the Greens express a degree of scepticism about free trade uncommon among major parties or the mainstream media. There is a general acceptance in the UK that the free movement of goods and services (though not labour) is an unmitigated boon. Even UKIP, for all their mistrust of the European common market, want to set up a <a href="http://www.thecommentator.com/article/4025/commonwealth_market">Commonwealth Free Trade Area</a>. By contrast, the Greens <a href="http://thetarge.co.uk/article/current-affairs/0283/green-parties-slam-us-trade-deal">oppose the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</a>, seeing it as <u>undemocratic</u>, and emphasise ‘<a href="http://greenparty.org.uk/assets/files/European%20Manifesto%202014.pdf"><u>fair trade</u></a>’ over ‘free trade’</div>
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On <u>Public Services</u>, the Greens are committed to <a href="http://greenparty.org.uk/assets/files/European%20Manifesto%202014.pdf">nationalising</a> railways, water and energy, policies that are <a href="http://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/11/04/nationalise-energy-and-rail-companies-say-public/">highly popular</a>, but rejected by the other big parties.</div>
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The position of the Greens highlights the benefits and dangers of genuinely defying consensus. On some issues, like nationalisation, you are likely to hit a position that has widespread appeal, and find yourself speaking for the ordinary man against an out of tough elite. On other issues, like, immigration, you’ll be voicing a fringe viewpoint that will likely get you written off as lunatic. And in some cases, as with the basic income, the idea will be so untested that you just won’t know how people will respond until you test it.<br />
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However they are received, greater acknowledgement of Green positions would stimulate and enhance what are often stale political debate.</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-81111596511699473362014-04-28T14:50:00.001-07:002014-04-28T14:53:46.168-07:00A tax on conspicuous consumption?<div style="text-align: justify;">
In a recent Vox article, Matthew Yglesias <a href="http://www.vox.com/2014/4/18/5620702/case-for-confiscatory-taxation">argues for punitive income and inheritance taxes</a>. His logic is that these taxes can have benefits beyond just raising government revenue – by deterring the high pay and large bequests that encourage socially harmful inequality, they can be beneficial even if nobody pays them.</div>
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Yglesisas repurposes the reasoning that underpins <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Excise">excise taxes</a>, such as those on tobacco or gambling, and applies it to income and inheritance:</div>
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<em>Tax T discourages behaviour B, which contributes to social problem P</em></div>
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Where T can be tax on cigarettes, behaviour B smoking and P the public health cost of smoking-related disease. Or in Yglesias’ argument, T is income tax, B is high corporate pay and P is income inequality.<br />
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An interesting question is whether this line of thinking can be used to justify rises in other existing taxes. I have <a href="http://socialproblemsarelikemaths.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/rawls-budget-and-case-for-punitive.html">previously discussed</a> the possibility that income tax could be used as a means to reduce working hours – <a href="http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=4405">Rupert Read claims</a> that “high tax rates are a good thing inasmuch as they discourage the culture of overwork which grips societies like ours”.</div>
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Another interesting application would be to increase sales tax (eg VAT) on ‘<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positional_good">positional goods</a>’, such as luxury fashion items and jewellery, which are bought primarily to increase the <a href="http://youngfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/The_value_of_positional_goods.pdf">owners’ social status</a>. Besides the direct negative effects for those who have to endure the other people’s wealth being shoved in their faces, the purchase of these goods also leads to an ‘<a href="http://patrickbackup2.blogspot.co.uk/2010/06/consumption-arms-race.html">arms race</a>’, where households spend more and more in an effort to best each other, with more of their money diverted from things that they will genuinely enjoy. <a href="http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1806737?uid=3738032&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21103705757451">Higher sales tax on luxury items</a> would mean fewer purchases of positional goods, lower status anxiety and help defuse the consumption arms race.</div>
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Robert Frank has gone further and advocated scrapping income tax and replacing it with a <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2011/12/the_progressive_consumption_tax_a_win_win_solution_for_reducing_american_economic_inequality_.html">progressive consumption tax</a> for these very reasons. Under Frank’s scheme, households would have to disclose their incomes and savings to the tax authorities, and would be taxed on the remainder. This is an interesting idea, but I have a couple of reservations. First, this seems an unnecessarily bureaucratic system involving a lot of paperwork and scope for errors. Secondly, it is clearly the case that not all consumption is on positional goods. Frank would tax spending on food and rent, money spent on meeting basic needs. By contrast, a positional goods tax can be targeted at more expensive goods that are more likely to be for display, rather than being intrinsically valuable.</div>
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However reformed, income tax and sales might just be the tip of the iceberg in terms of Yglesias’ argument – what other existing taxes can be reconsidered as excise duties?</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-62868192892333373132014-03-30T14:08:00.000-07:002014-03-31T15:19:47.019-07:00The Misleading Rhetoric of the ‘Global Race’<div align="justify">
The idea that Britain is involved in a ‘<a href="http://www.conservatives.com/Video/Webcameron.aspx?id=191e42d4-6f6b-4528-8e52-648fe1c725de">global race</a>’ which it will ‘lose’ to other countries unless the necessary reforms are undertaken has been a staple of Conservative party rhetoric for the <a href="http://www.totalpolitics.com/print/344832/get-set-for-cameronand39s-global-race.thtml">past 18 months</a>. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/sep/22/what-is-global-race-conservatives-ed-miliband">Numerous</a> <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21578652-tories-have-found-their-theme-sadly-it-not-changing-how-they-govern-puffing-hard">commentators</a> have reviewed and ridiculed the phenomenon, with critics typically returning to two objections. Firstly, there is the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/sep/22/what-is-global-race-conservatives-ed-miliband">lack of precision around what exactly the race is for</a><em></em>:</div>
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<em>This race, we are told, is economic. Our opponents are usually specified: the rising countries of Asia and South America such as China, India and Brazil. Yet the prize is vaguely and promiscuously defined: ‘jobs’, ‘wealth’, ‘growth’, ‘trade’, ‘talent’, ‘technology’, ‘skills’, ‘capital’, ‘competitiveness’, ‘big ideas’,‘influence’, innovation’, ‘investment’, ‘investment opportunities’, ‘recovery’</em></div>
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This lack of clarity leads to the suspicion that the argument is not the result of any analysis of global economic and social trends, but is rather an exercise in creating a foreign bogeyman to threaten those who object to Tory policies.</div>
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The second common objection to the metaphor of the global race is its implication that economic trends are zero-sum, that <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/sep/22/what-is-global-race-conservatives-ed-miliband">for every winner there must be a loser</a></div>
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<em>Countries get richer together. If China carries on reforming and growing, there will be more opportunities there for Britain</em></div>
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Yet Chancellor <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5265a32e-b5c7-11e3-81cb-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz2xNOzbHfg">George Osborne’s article with his German counterpart Wolfgang Schauble in Thursday’s Financial Times</a> continued to display these confusions and worse. In a single paragraph, they list four domains in which they believe European countries are at risk of losing the global race – economic growth, patent applications (presumably as a proxy for innovation or technological development), youth unemployment and social welfare spending:</div>
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<em>Recovery in Europe is vital. But our continent is falling behind. Over the past six years the European economy has stalled. In the same period the Indian economy has grown by more than a third, and the Chinese economy by almost 70 per cent. Europe’s share of world patent applications almost halved in the past decade. A quarter of young people looking for work cannot find any. Europe accounts for just over 7 per cent of the world’s population but 50 per cent of global social welfare spending. Reform is the key.</em></div>
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But in each of these domains the metaphor of a race is misleading – either because they are focusing on the wrong metric or because a competitive approach is inappropriate</div>
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Though Osborne and Schauble do not explicitly refer to the idea of a global race, this is clearly the image they are trying to invoke when they worry that “our continent is falling behind”. But who is Europe falling behind, and in which race?</div>
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The first race, it becomes clear, is the race for higher economic output. In this race, Europe is falling behind China and India, as they have seen higher growth in the past six years. Stated so clearly, the absurdity of the claim should be apparent – rich Europe cannot be falling <em>behind </em>much poorer countries like China and India – it is clearly ahead of them.* Rather, what is happening is that China and India are <em>catching up</em> to the EU.</div>
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Being caught up might not be as bad as falling behind, but it’s still almost always a bad thing. Yet there are a couple of salient facts required to put that in context. The first is that this is a race where it is harder to lead than to chase. The economic principle of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(economics)">convergence</a> means that poorer countries will tend to grow faster than rich ones, essentially because they can trade with and copy technologies from them. The GDP race is one that it is hard to lead – the EU is like a cyclist which must accept that other riders will benefit from their slipstream. Thus lower growth than India or China is not a tragedy to be bemoaned, but the almost inevitable consequence of having a bigger economy. The real problem for Europe is its lack of growth in absolute terms.</div>
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The second critical fact is that this is not a case of Europe needing to fend off immediate rivals in a close race Rather, Europe, in seeking to extend its lead over India and China, is like a runner sprinting to lap straggling laggards in the race. <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita">Depending on the source</a>, average EU income is 20th-30th in the world. By contrast, China is placed in the 90s and India in the 130s. Stepping out of the metaphor, there is something deeply unpleasant about Europe seeking to out-grow poor countries like India and China. If Osborne and Schauble want faster growth than India and China, then by implication what they want is a more grossly unequal world where the rich are even more distant from the global poor than before. </div>
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The second race that Osborne and Schauble want to win is the competition for most patent applications. They are correct that Europe’s share of global patents has declined, but again, they fail to provide the relevant context. First, in absolute terms, patent applications are around 50% higher than a decade ago, according to <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.PAT.RESD/countries/1W?display=default">World Bank data</a>. Second, this seems like another area where convergence has occurred – the EU still has more patents per capita than average, with 10% of global applications, despite (as Osborne and Schauble later observe) having only 7% of the global population.</div>
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The third point made is around youth unemployment. However, there is no comparative metric used to illustrate this, so it’s not clear who Europe is supposed to be ‘falling behind’. </div>
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Osborne and Schauble’s fourth indicator is the most pernicious – social welfare spending. This is one race where it is particularly unclear what constitutes ‘winning’. I personally would have thought that out-spending other countries would be beating them, but it is clear that the finance ministers see Europe’s high spending as a failure. But I can only presume that they do not see having the lowest social welfare spending in the world as a desirable goal, either.</div>
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The fact that Osborne and Schauble offer the context of Europe’s population suggests they see this as some sort of odd ‘race to the middle’ – in their view Europe should be closer to average global social spending. The implication is that social spending is a ‘goldilocks good’ – some is desirable, but too much is a bad thing. But if this is the case, why should we take the global average to be the best indicator of the ideal level? Being above the global average for social spending could just mean that other countries spend too little on social welfare. And in this case that is almost certainly what it means. Why should we care about an average that is clearly pulled down by developing countries lacking the finances to develop welfare states of their own?</div>
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There are almost certainly some domains where competitive global comparison is the appropriate way to think about them. But Osborne and Schauble’s letter suggests the Conservatives still haven’t found them</div>
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* Even is the race is in terms of absolute GDP (ie not adjusted for China and India’s larger populations), the EU remains clearly ahead of India and just ahead of China</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-80008192363844155062014-01-12T03:09:00.000-08:002014-01-12T03:09:33.290-08:00Can cosmopolitans vote for Scottish independence?A cosmopolitan nationalist is a contradiction in terms. Yet I want to suggest that in some cases consistent cosmopolitans may be justified in supporting nationalist causes – in particular, voting ‘yes’ in independence referenda like the ones anticipated in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-13326310">Scotland</a> and <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25353086">Catalonia</a> in 2014.<br />
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<a href="http://www.philosophy.ohiou.edu/PDF/EGJ_Political%20Cosmopolitanism_Vol-2.pdf">Cosmopolitanism</a> is the moral or political theory that insists that nationality is morally arbitrary – that we have no greater reason to promote or care about the welfare of our compatriots than people of any other country. This is, almost by definition, antagonistic to nationalism, which insists that we woe at least some loyalty to our nation and its inhabitants. Cosmopolitanism means, literally, citizenship of the world. Nationalism seeks to carve out a slice of the world, and put it above others. </div>
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So cosmopolitans and nationalists are certainly unlikely comrades, but if circumstances conspire in the right way, I think they can end up on the same side. </div>
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The first point to make is that while cosmopolitans embrace global citizenship in a moral sense, few major cosmopolitans have called for its institutional corollary – a world state. <a href="https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1752-pogge-cosmopolitanism-and-sovereignty">Thomas Pogge offers</a> perhaps the most prominent discussion of an ideal cosmopolitan global order, and maintains an important role for nation-states, as part of a ‘multi-layered’ order, with power diffused down to regional institutions and up to global organisations. Moreover, Pogge sees secessionist referenda, as in Scotland or Catalonia, as part of the “cosmopolitan ideal of democracy”:</div>
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<i>“The inhabitants of any contiguous territory of reasonable shape, if sufficiently numerous, may decide-through some majoritarian or supermajoritarian procedure-to form themselves into a political unit of a level commensurate with their number”</i></div>
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Even commitment to a world state does not necessarily entail opposition to secession. After all, voters are being asked to choose between Scotland and the UK, or Catalonia and Spain – ‘World State’ is unlikely to appear on any ballots. On the face of it, World Staters are likely to oppose secession as it represents a move further away from a World State – greater fragmentation, rather than unity. But it could be that a more indirect route to global unification seems more likely – for example, if one of the new states is more open to multi-national institutions (as Scotland appears to be more supportive of the EU than the rest of the UK). More likely, neither option will make a World State substantially more likely, in which case the World Stater is in the same position as other cosmopolitans, forced to fall back on other considerations. </div>
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So what considerations should guide a cosmopolitan voter? While Pogge suggests that cosmopolitans should accept the decisions of referenda, he does not offer any guidance on how to decide which side to support once a referendum is called. One possibility is that this falls within the legitimate sphere of compatriot preference that some cosmopolitans accept – that this is one area where it is OK to give voice to nationalist sympathies. If this is the case, then the decision is simple - the cosmopolitan is free to vote for whichever country they feel most emotional attachment to. </div>
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But suppose we want to deny it is ever legitimate to show compatriot preference, or perhaps that we genuinely have no emotional preference? In that case, there are three relevant considerations that a cosmopolitan needs to account for: </div>
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1. Will secession leave the new country (ie Scotland/Catalonia) better off?</div>
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2. Will secession leave the rump/original country (ie ‘rUK’/Spain) better off? </div>
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3. Will secession be better for those from other countries (eg Spain, Romania, Somalia, Niger)? </div>
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This might seem trivial, but it is important to bear all three considerations in mind when reviewing the arguments for independence. For starters, notice that the vast majority of the debate addresses only consideration 1. </div>
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The cosmopolitan must therefore be indifferent to any zero-sum nationalist claims. If Catalonia claims it will be richer with independence because it will have to share less of its wealth with Spain, then the cosmopolitan will not see this as positive, since it will make Spain worse off. Moreover, they must be alert to knock-on effects. If an independent Scotland would be a fairer, more equal place than rUK, this good must be balanced against the harm to the rest of Britain of losing Scotland’s moderating influence (and, for example, embracing neo-liberalism more fully). Cosmopolitans are also likely to pay particular attention to domains like foreign and immigration policy which impact people of other nationalities. Thus an independent Scotland’s more pacific stance in international relations and greater openness to immigration is likely to strengthen the cosmopolitan’s appetite for independence (assuming, of course, that this does not significantly affect rUK’s policy). </div>
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Thus a cosmopolitan’s reasoning on the independence question is likely to be more complex and more pragmatic than most. other voters. There are more interests to be considered, certain arguments that must be thrown out, other arguments that must be given greater emphasis. But it is entirely possible that independence may be the course that best promotes cosmopolitan values.</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-65271740684541015562013-12-31T12:25:00.002-08:002013-12-31T12:25:48.642-08:00What does people analytics mean for social justice?<br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">2013 has seen growing interest in
the idea of ‘<a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-at-work/354681/">people analytics</a>’ – informally described as the application of ‘<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moneyball">Moneyball</a>’
to corporate HR, but more formally defined as the use of predictive statistical
analysis to inform the recruitment and assessment in workers. Just as sports
teams are increasingly attuned to the power of statistics in judging player
ability and informing their signings, so companies are looking to use the power
of numbers over potentially misleading ‘gut instincts’ and all too short
interviews. The hope is that the use of ‘big data’ can offer more reliable
insight into the attributes that make for effective employees by drawing robust
correlations. For years baseball coaches <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moneyball#Synopsis">focused on the wrong statistics</a>,
according to Moneyball, for example emphasising batting average, rather than On
Base Percentage. Perhaps the same is true of Human Resource managers, who could
be over-emphasising things like educational attainment – an early finding
appears to be that college degrees are overrated.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Commentators have been divided as
to whether the people analytics is a promising or ominous development for
society. For Don <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-at-work/354681/">Peck</a>, people analytics offers hope for fairer hiring processes,
with the marginalisation of (often unintentionally) prejudiced human
intervention, since “A mountain of scholarly literature has shown that the
intuitive way we now judge professional potential is rife with snap judgments
and hidden biases”. Moreover, people analytics can enhance social mobility by reducing
the influence of educational background:</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>For decades, as we’ve assessed people’s potential in the professional
workforce, the most important piece of data—the one that launches careers or
keeps them grounded—has been educational background: typically, whether and
where people went to college, and how they did there. Over the past couple of
generations, colleges and universities have become the gatekeepers to a
prosperous life...But this relationship is likely to loosen in the coming years</i></span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">However, <a href="http://www.salon.com/2013/12/13/your_boss_wants_to_be_nate_silver/">Andrew Leonard</a> is wary
of a world in which bosses have a clear view of their employees’ productivity,
foreseeing “a darker scenario, one that increasingly seems to be playing out
already: The best workers reap huge rewards; everyone else struggles for the
scraps”.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">To a large
extent these arguments play out familiar debates from political philosophy over
the value and desirability of <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equal-opportunity/#5">meritocracy</a>. Peck’s account of helping those
consigned to the scrapheap because of their past, or neglected because of
latent prejudice gets to the heart of the view that meritocracy is morally
valuable because it <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equal-opportunity/#6">avoids wrongful discrimination</a>. On the other hand, Leonard
taps into a concern that meritocracy neglects substantive inequalities – as <a href="http://www.sociology.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/2002-05.pdf">Adam Swift puts it</a>: “Why care about unequal chances
of mobility between positions rather than the extent to which those positions
are unequal?<span style="mso-bidi-font-family: "TimesNewRoman,Bold"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">”. Moreover, there is the concern that material
inequality could be exacerbated by the psychological effects of living in a
perfect meritocracy, as <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/jun/29/comment">famously suggested by Michael Young</a>:<br />
<br />
</span><span lang="EN" style="font-size: x-small;"><i>If meritocrats believe, as more and
more of them are encouraged to, that their advancement comes from their own
merits, they can feel they deserve whatever they can get. <o:p></o:p></i></span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><i><br /></i></span>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span lang="EN" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: x-small;"><i>They can be insufferably smug, much more so
than the people who knew they had achieved advancement not on their own merit
but because they were, as somebody's son or daughter, the beneficiaries of
nepotism. The newcomers can actually believe they have morality on their side. <o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family: "TimesNewRoman,Bold"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Thus if meritocracy is
achieved, the successful develop a superiority complex and <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>increase their power and privilege while the
unsuccessful lose all sense of self-worth, with nobody to blame for their
plight but themselves. The result is a society polarised beyond recognition.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family: "TimesNewRoman,Bold"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Peck and Leonard do not add
anything distinctive to the debate around meritocracy, but rather offer a
glimpse of a society which more closely approximates meritocracy. However, I
think that people analytics has the potential to bring to the surface tensions
which are currently insignificant or neglected in the meritocracy debate.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family: "TimesNewRoman,Bold"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">First, people analytics could
have an effect on the perceived relationship between meritocracy and economic efficiency.
One common rationale for meritocracy is that ensuring that the best candidates
are in the best positions should secure higher productivity and consequently
make society as a whole richer. But this is not necessarily the case. If the
cost of securing a better candidate is greater than the extra wealth generated
by that worker (over and above the candidate that would otherwise be hired)
then meritocratic hiring is less efficient. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family: "TimesNewRoman,Bold"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">People analytics is likely to
bring this tension into the open because it is likely to develop more or less
fine grained tools, leaving it to the hirers how much they believe it is worth
investing in securing the best workers. In some cases, cruder and cheaper
methods are bound to be chosen, even though they might mean overlooking the
best person for the role, because the cost of identifying that person is greater
than the benefit they would provide. This is likely to test the resolve of
meritocrats – is their ideal important enough to force companies to invest in
recruitment, even if is not worth the cost?</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family: "TimesNewRoman,Bold"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">A second – more hopeful –
possibility is that people analytics might bring to the fore the flexibility of
the concept of merit. Peck alludes to the possibility that people analytics
might be more about getting people into “better-fitting”, rather than “better” jobs.
That is – people analytics might be less about separating the capable and
brilliant from the incompetent than about finding the niche that suits each
individual’s aptitudes. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family: "TimesNewRoman,Bold"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">Even if this is a bit utopian,
people analytics could help bring to the fore the changeability of marketable
skills. The original idea of Moneyball was not to find the best players, but
rather those who are ‘undervalued’ – players whose talents were insufficiently
appreciated by the market. This is an inherently dynamic process – for as soon
as other teams adopt a similar scouting and tactical style, a different type of
player will become undervalued. A couple of cycles of this process should serve
to demonstrate that success is not simply about being the best player, but to have
the right skills for the right environment. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; mso-bidi-font-family: "TimesNewRoman,Bold"; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold;">If people analytics produces
similar cycles in the job market, then it should reinforce to the successful
that they are lucky, and that at any given point their luck could change.
Moreover, this sense of contingency is likely to guard against the arrogance
and despair that Michael Young foresaw in his vision of meritocracy. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 10pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The idea of meritocracy is a
complicated one, offering hope for human dignity and equality on the one hand,
but carrying the risk of polarisation and division. The prospect of people
analytics further clouds the purported ideal – its development must be watched
carefully.</span></div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-21478891742510774862013-11-03T14:23:00.000-08:002013-11-03T14:26:12.816-08:00Privatised Healthcare: What Would We Lose?<br />
<div align="justify">
Contrasting the different challenges facing British and American healthcare, <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/10406486/Western-health-care-is-stuck-in-the-sickbay.html">Janet Daley attacks</a> the “anachronistic and unsatisfactory” arrangement of a “state-owned-and-run monopoly of medical provision”. This throws up a number of obvious issues around the equity, efficiency and sustainability of these different models. But even aside from the questions of whether state run healthcare is cheaper, more equal or produces better health outcomes, I think Daley accidentally touches upon a couple of underappreciated benefits of the NHS style system: the limitation of unpleasant choice, and avoidance of the distrust of the market.<br />
<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
<em>“Note to politicians: there is a new generation of adults out there who buy their holidays and their electronic equipment on the internet, who purchase their insurance on price-comparison websites”</em><br />
<em><br /></em></div>
<div align="justify">
Daley makes the automatic assumption that because they live in a consumerist society and are constantly making consumer choices, people must desire and enjoy these choices. We do live in an era where most people purchase their insurance on the internet. But that doesn’t mean that they <em>like </em>doing so – in fact, the majority of people see it as an unpleasant chore. The ubiquitous adverts for price comparison websites are intended a) to motivate people to exercise their consumer choice and b) to convince people that acting the consumer is less unpleasant than they expect. <br />
<br />
So why then does Daley assume that the NHS deprives people options they want to take, rather than preserving them from having to go through tedious and time consuming decisions? I can’t be the only one to look at the process of Obamacare and be extremely grateful that I don’t have to worry about health insurance, don’t have to sit down on my hard-earned weekend and run through the different plans, however nicely they are laid out. I can’t be the only one grateful that I don’t need to worry about anything, and can still know I will receive care when I need it.</div>
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<em><br /></em>
<em>“A system that is absolutely, unconditionally free at the point of use with no questions asked and no exceptions made”</em></div>
<div align="justify">
<br />
Daley sees this as an outdated principle which can only cause problems. But one benefit this principle brings is obvious. It means that the unwell and their families never need to worry about money at a stressful and difficult time. Even if the money can be claimed back, even if the excess is small, the fact of needing to have money free to pay for care just adds another potential headache at a difficult time.<br />
<br />
But, more subtly, the fact of money changing hands alters the social dynamic between doctor and patient. For example, psychologists have shown that ‘<a href="http://www.laymanpsych.com/what-is-priming/">priming</a>’ people with the idea of money <a href="http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/brain-wise/201212/does-money-make-you-mean">alters their outlook</a>: it makes them more individualistic and less socially-oriented, a worrying trait to encourage in doctors. <br />
<br />
Moreover, the exchange of money creates a more ‘transactional’ relationship between doctor and patient, and potentially erodes trust between doctor and patient. The doctor’s job is no longer to make me better, but to get the most money out of me. How do I know they are prescribing that drug because it is the most effective and not because it is the most expensive? </div>
<div align="justify">
<br />
Now I’m sure Daley would respond that those willing to take the time and effort to work out their optimal health insurance plan will receive better care at a lower cost. And she would probably say that a bit more mistrust between doctor and patient might make doctors less complacent, and force them to improve standards to meet the challenges of their patients. I have my doubts, but they are not implausible claims, However, she cannot deny that something has been lost, that people would be in these ways worse off, without the NHS. And so a lot depends on showing that cost and effectiveness would be clearly higher with greater privatisation.</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-35228690531974888602013-09-22T11:00:00.000-07:002013-09-22T11:01:28.964-07:00Are opinion polls bad for democracy?<br />
<div align="justify">
Ahead of today’s general election, the German broadcaster ZDF has <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/latest-poll-shows-governing-coalition-has-narrow-lead-ahead-of-election-a-923483.html">broken with convention</a> and published an opinion poll in the final few days before the vote. Previously, it had been agreed that surveys would not be released fewer than ten days before polling day for fear of influencing voters. This is a worrying development because it conflicts with three of the most prominent theories about why democracy is valuable: aggregative, epistemic and deliberative theories. <br />
<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
According to the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy#Theory">aggregative theory</a>, democracy is fundamentally a procedure for reconciling the different interests and preferences of citizens. On any given issue, citizens will come with ready-formed preferences, based on their personalities and circumstances. It does not matter <em>why</em> people want to criminalise cannabis or ban the burqa – the only salient question is whether more people are for or against these proposals. The more popular policies are the ones that should be enacted.<br />
<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
However, aggregative democracy depends on people accurately reporting their preferences. If we cannot rely on voters to vote for the policies they actually want, then the vote will not reveal which proposal is genuinely more popular, the one which satisfies the most preferences. Opinion polls make it more likely that people’s votes will not reflect their true preferences. If my favoured party or policy is far behind in the poll, I may believe it is pointless to vote for them, or even to bother to vote at all. Opinion polls make tactical voting more likely – I may cast a positive vote for a policy or party that I don’t like to stop a worse one succeeding. In other words, opinion polls help to mess up the clean aggregative interpretation of elections.<br />
<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
A second major theory of democracy is the <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/#Ins">epistemic view</a>. Epistemic theories see democracy as trying to find the ‘correct’ or ‘true’ answers to political questions, such as ‘What is the best set of policies to encourage economic growth?’ Epistemic theories take their inspiration from ideas such as the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisdom_of_the_crowd">wisdom of crowds</a> – the notion that the more views are canvassed on an issue, the more likely they are to converge on a correct answer. <br />
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<div align="justify">
This basic principle is formalised in the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet's_jury_theorem">Condorect Jury Theorem</a>. However, one of the key assumptions of the theorem is that votes must be independent – person 1 voting for A should not make it any more likely that person 2 will vote for A. Imagine if you ask two separate people for directions, and they both advise you to go right. This would ordinarily give you reasonable confidence that this advice is sound. But if you knew the second person was only copying the first, you would be more likely to seek further verification.<br />
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<div align="justify">
Opinion polls may flout the independence criterion valued by epistemic theorists of democracy, because of the momentum they create. If my instinct is to vote Pirate, but everybody else appears to be voting CDU, I am bound to wonder if I have missed something incredible in the CDU platform. Conversely, the lack of support for the Pirates is likely to make me reconsider their competence. The <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asch_conformity_experiments">Asch conformity experiments</a> show that people are susceptible to peer pressure even on beliefs they have a great deal of confidence in – these effects are liable to be even more acute in politics. <br />
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<div align="justify">
A third perspective on democracy emphasises <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative_democracy">deliberation</a>. According to this view, democracy is as much about forming opinions as aggregating them. Thus deliberative democracy emphasises free, open and rational debate, whereby citizens attempt to criticise and refine their own views, as well as understanding those of others, in the hope of achieving consensus. <br />
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Deliberative democrats have reason to fear opinion polls because they distract from the process of debate. They distort media coverage and public attention by encouraging passive spectatorship of a competition, rather than engagement with ideas and policies. This creates a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horse_race_journalism">‘horse race’</a> model of politics, where tactics, strategies and who’s winning draws more focus than substantive discussion of different platforms. Moreover, deliberative democrats are wary of excessive focus on voting rather than other elements of the political process (such as deliberation), a trend exacerbated by polling.<br />
<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
These arguments may give opinion polls too much credit – it could well be that they have much less influence on voting behaviour than suggested here. However, if opinion polls are in fact this powerful, they may indeed be damaging for democracy.</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-19569585328631110082013-08-04T13:44:00.000-07:002013-08-04T13:44:05.926-07:00Nigel Farage: Defender of Immigrants?<br />
<div align="justify">
Among the many outraged voices at the the use of vans to tell illegal immigrants to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23489925">“go home or face arrest”</a>, perhaps the <a href="http://liberalconspiracy.org/2013/07/25/even-nigel-farage-thinks-the-go-home-vans-are-nasty/">most surprising</a> was that of the UKIP leader Nigel Farage, who called the message “nasty, unpleasant”. Farage’s position on the issue was unexpected, given UKIP’s <a href="http://www.ukip.org/issues/policy-pages/immigration">fiercely anti-immigrant</a> stance at present. Yet if Farage is wily enough, his intervention could mark the start of a more nuanced position on immigration, with major strategic benefits for the party.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
The argument I envisage UKIP making, basically, is that these desperate and illiberal measures are a consequence of the UK’s membership of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration_(European_Economic_Area)_Regulations_2006">membership of the European Economic Area</a>, which compels Britain to allow entry to all EEA citizens. Since visitors from the EEA account for <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-january-to-march-2013/immigration-statistics-january-to-march-2013#european-economic-area-eea">70% of arrivals</a> to the UK, the Conservatives are forced to squeeze the remaining 30% as hard as they can – too hard, even for UKIP’s liking – to meet their targets on reducing net immigration to the “<a href="http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/Immigration.aspx">tens of thousands</a>”. By contrast, UKIP, Farage can say, would simply pull out of the EEA, restrict migration from Europe, and do away with the heavy-handed approach of this current government towards other immigrants. If he is bold enough, Farage would criticise policies such as <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21884415">immigrant bonds</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23552088">spot checks</a> and requiring <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10158675/Private-landlords-face-3000-fines-for-renting-to-illegal-immigrants.html">landlords to be informants</a>. In sum, Farage could stand against the idea that Britain should be the “<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2013/jul/12/sarah-teather-angry-voices-immigration">hostile environment</a>” for immigrants that the current government seems to envisage, with the promise that UKIP offer a more humane way to keep immigrant numbers down.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
The big advantage of this position would be to give UKIP some defence against the <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/ukip-councillors-racist-rants-more-1897414">accusations of racism</a> that are bound to pursue a right-wing party by showing a willingness to stand up for vulnerable minorities. If UKIP are to break into the mainstream, they need to be seen as a respectable and non-racist – these sorts of positions would go a long way to making them credible. They would also strengthen their claim to be an alternative to an increasingly out of touch and broken political elite.</div>
<div align="justify">
<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
Of course, the strategy brings risks. If Farage and the UKIP leadership do not really believe the position I am sketching out, then it is likely to ring hollow. Moreover, this strategy would require UKIP to defend predominantly non-white (non-EU) immigrants at the expense of predominantly white (EU) immigrants. Insofar as their support <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/robert-ford/are-ukip-supporters-racist_b_2193055.html">genuinely is racist</a>, it might abandon the party. But then, it might be in the long-term interests of UKIP to trade some of these core backers for a more moderate audience. </div>
<div align="justify">
<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
A more interesting question is whether such a shift would be good for British politics. On the one hand, any move that tries to make the immigration debate less toxic and which tries to move beyond demonising migrants is bound to do some good. Further, it could encourage some interesting and productive coalitions between left and right, much needed in an area that doesn’t cleanly divide left and right. Then again, I can’t help but revolt against anything that gives UKIP and their brand of unreconstituted conservatism and libertarianism more influence.But it would certainly be compelling to watch…</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-78680428252846873142013-07-21T14:43:00.000-07:002013-07-21T14:43:47.242-07:00On the basic liberty to eat what you like<br />
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Contrary to popular reports, the recent <a href="http://www.schoolfoodplan.com/">School Food Plan</a> for England and Wales <a href="http://www.libdemvoice.org/opinion-does-the-school-food-plan-really-ban-packed-lunches-35295.html">does not call</a> for packed lunches to be banned. However, the idea of a ban, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-23270715">mooted by Henry Dimbleby</a> – one of the report’s authors – is interesting because of the response it has provoked. Dimbleby suggests that a blanket ban might be unwise because “There's a strong libertarian streak in the English”. Sure enough, <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/banning-packed-lunches-enforcing-school-2047467">‘Fleet Street Fox’</a> raises the spectre of totalitarianism in the <em>Mirror</em>, describing the idea in the following terms: “So [packed lunches] must be banned, he says. Not improved. Not guidelined. Not discussed. Just banned, like thought in China.” The frothy outrage is reminiscent of the common objections to the proposal of ‘<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meatless_Monday">Meat Free Mondays</a>’ in certain dining halls – presented as a matter of <a href="http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/indialenon/100023945/a-whole-new-cut-of-student-rebellion/">freedom and rights</a>.<br />
<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
In general, the idea that people should have the ability to decide for themselves what goes in their own mouths is surely uncontroversial. This is a fairly clear example of the sort of autonomy that anybody with any sympathy for liberalism is bound to respect. Yet at the same time, there are very few freedoms which are entirely unconditional or unconstrained, if for no other reason than to avoid them restricting other valuable freedoms. On what grounds might it be morally legitimate to override this freedom?<br />
<br /></div>
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The most obvious argument is the paternalist one – where a freedom is likely to be misused in a way harmful to the agent, it is sometimes right to require them to act in a more prudent way. This is the logic behind requiring people to wear seatbelts, or prohibiting them from taking harmful recreational drugs. In the case of compulsory school meals, the government or school would be taking away children (or parents’) freedom to choose their own lunches, because the negative consequences of these actions for their health are too great.<br />
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<div align="justify">
A second argument posits that compulsory school lunches are legitimate because children are incapable of full autonomy, and so infringing their freedom is less morally significant. Because children are generally less informed, not fully educated and perhaps not capable of full rationality yet, their choices are less worthy of respect and protection. In most countries, children below a certain age – <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/School_leaving_age">usually 16</a> – are not judged capable of deciding that they don’t want to go to school. <br />
<br />
This argument is complicated by the fact that most children don’t have much control over their diet anyway – their parents decide what they eat. In this case, the question is the more contentious one of whether the state or parents should have control over children. The most plausible response is that both should have a role to play – the state should not dominate child rearing, but nor should it treat children as the property of their guardians, free to treat them as they wish. Just as children cannot unilaterally decide to quit school before they reach an appropriate age, nor can their parents decide to pull them out. This is because in certain cases it is necessary for the state to protect the interests of children from their parents.<br />
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Finally, compulsory school lunches can be defended on the grounds that they enhance freedom in the long term. For a start, improving a person’s physical health means that they are likely to be able to do more physically strenuous things for longer as they get older. Moreover, there is the possibility that school meals will introduce children to different tastes, ingredients and styles of food, and alert them to different food cultures, or ways of relating to food, thus expanding their set of options.<br />
<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
These arguments are not at all mutually exclusive – indeed, they feed off one another. The paternalistic argument is all the stronger for the diminished autonomy of children and if its benefit involves greater freedom as well as better health. The paternalistic argument gives a justification for overriding parents’ desires for their children.<br />
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Together these arguments suggest that a ban on packed lunches is not a clear infringement of liberty. However, it still remains up for debate whether these are good enough reasons with positive enough effects to justify such a heavy-handed measure.</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-81234088095030223582013-05-26T12:01:00.001-07:002013-11-03T14:26:39.912-08:00Nationalise energy?<div align="justify">
Thinkers and politicians have been debating the limits and failures of markets since the beginning of capitalism. However, the question of which spheres of society are appropriate for free markets is increasingly pertinent, given the current economic and political context. Since the financial crisis, there has been greater awareness of the fallibility of the neo-liberal model, leading to curiosity towards, if not embrace of alternatives. Politically, the <a href="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/riseoftheredtories/#.UZep-7U-Z4w">Red Tory</a> and <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/apr/24/blue-labour-maurice-glasman">Blue Labour</a> movements have revealed major currents of anti-market thinking within both major UK parties.</div>
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Against this backdrop, the work of social psychologists like <a href="http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/bschwar1/">Barry Schwartz</a>, <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/~ss957/">Sheena Iyengar</a> and <a href="http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~dtg/gilbert.htm">Dan Gilbert</a> is deserving of close attention. Among the various problems with free markets that they identify are three observations:</div>
<ol>
<li> <div align="justify">
Economic interactions have a fundamentally distinctive character, and require us to relate to people in a different way. The relationship between buyer and seller is a fundamentally antagonistic one: the salesman is trying to squeeze as much money out of their customers as possible, while the buyer is trying to get away with paying as little as possible for their goods. This creates an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion – can you believe the advice from the shop attendant, or be sure that they aren’t trying to cheat you? This, in turn, is likely to colour our attitudes and behaviour in non-economic contexts.</div>
</li>
<li> <div align="justify">
The very act of consumer choice can be overwhelming and reduce welfare. To be confronted by the wide array of options in many modern markets is disconcerting, and often unpleasant. It demands time and energy to establish all your options, to research them and to reach a decision. Often, this can seem more effort than it is worth, and lead to paralysis, or decisions being postponed. I go into a shop looking to buy a new laptop and discover there are twenty different brands that meet my specifications. So I have to go home, look them up on the internet and read all the reviews. By the time I get round to going to the shop again, I’ve had to struggle for two extra weeks with my old laptop, and spent much longer than I wanted to worrying about it</div>
</li>
<li> <div align="justify">
Moreover, once the choice is made, the options foregone are likely to continue to haunt us. Every time our purchase falls short of perfection, we are likely to be reminded of the fact that there might be a better option out there, which we have given up.</div>
</li>
</ol>
<div align="justify">
What are we supposed to do with these arguments? The clear implication is that liberalisation has gone too far, and that some markets ought to be restricted. But which ones? How much choice is enough?</div>
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<br /></div>
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These are big questions, and broad-brush answers will inevitably ignore the vast diversity of different markets. The best way forward is to take the social psychologists’ criticisms as a general set of considerations against free markets, and to take different markets in turn to see if the freedom they involve is worth the psychological cost. </div>
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<br /></div>
<div align="justify">
I think that the British retail markets for gas and electricity exemplify many of the problems identified by Schwartz et al, and where the anti-market theory can produce some concrete policy prescriptions.Since the late 1990s, the government has sought to encourage a competitive market for consumer gas and electricity, with the idea that the fear of losing customers to nimbler rivals will incentivise energy companies to keep prices down for everybody.</div>
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<br /></div>
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The question of whether this project has been successful in reducing energy costs is a difficult one to answer. Prices fell after the privatisation of energy companies, but this coincided with a period of global excesses in energy supplies. It has also been suggested that initial savings came as a result of ‘asset sweating’, resulting in under-investment, and storing up higher energy bills for the future. UK consumers pay less for their energy bills than the rest of Europe, but again this comparison may be misleading. Different tax systems make like-for-like comparison extremely difficult. Britain’s offshore gas reserves have also been a factor in keeping energy prices lower.<sup>1</sup> </div>
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All this means is that it is an extremely technical question, beyond my knowledge or expertise, whether a liberalised, competitive market means cheaper energy. However, the evidence is ambiguous enough to suggest that the benefits may not be that great. What I want to suggest is that there are other considerations that should be taken into account when we decide how to structure our energy market besides the question of how to make energy as cheap as possible. A competitive energy market may have costs which outweigh the minor, perhaps non-existent benefits it brings.</div>
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The current market in energy exemplifies the flaws identified by the psychologists above. In the first place, it is a market riven by deep mistrust. <a href="http://www.prweek.com/uk/features/1124548/">The vast majority</a> of energy consumers believe that energy companies are keeping prices unnecessarily high, or are deliberately complicating the information they give to consumers. Now, there are probably few markets where consumers genuinely believe that companies have their best interests at heart. However, in the energy market there is an unusual sense that suppliers are trying to exploit the ignorance of their customers.</div>
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On the second point above, switching energy company is among the more unpleasant consumer processes facing people in the UK. The options available are <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fc507dd8-ab63-11e2-ac71-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2UOVeBwar">notoriously complex</a>, and difficult to compare. Even if the government and the regulator Ofgem succeed in their <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15304765">attempts to simplify</a> this system, this will not mean that it will be obvious to each household which is the best supplier and tariff for them. There is still the problem that a proper comparison of energy tariffs requires consumers to accurately predict how much energy they are likely to use in the future. Moreover, choices between fixed and variable tariffs involve an element of gambling on how much prices will rise or fall by. Inevitably, then, people refuse to participate in the market – having to take higher energy prices because they cannot face the hassle and time investment of switching. An <a href="http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/rmr/Documents1/RMR_FINAL.pdf">Ofgem report</a> classified 80-90% of consumers as ‘passive’ or ‘disengaged’ from the market.</div>
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The British energy market typifies the third great vice of modern markets, too – it is a choice that never goes away. Given the volatility of the energy market, with deals constantly hovering in and out of view, consumers are increasingly expected to be thinking about their energy provider all the time. This is not an unpleasant decision that you can grit your teeth and get through once every few years. No, for an energy consumer to properly participate in the market, they need to be ever-vigilant – for example, by signing up the ‘<a href="http://www.moneysavingexpert.com/cheapenergyclub">Cheap energy club</a>’, which exhorts them to “Constantly monitor your tariff”. </div>
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Perhaps these psychological ill effects are outweighed by the price benefits of the current system. Or perhaps there are ways of reforming the market to reduce or improve the choices faced. However, given <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/11/renationalisation-poll-peoples-charter">expressed</a> public <a href="http://money.aol.co.uk/2012/10/11/energy-firms-should-be-nationalised-say-aol-users/">support</a> for re-nationalisation, these issues seem worthy of discussion.</div>
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<sup>1 </sup>For more of an overview of the benefits and failures of privatisation see <a href="http://www.which.co.uk/documents/pdf/the-imbalance-of-power---which-report-308858.pdf">this</a> Which? report, or <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n17/james-meek/how-we-happened-to-sell-off-our-electricity">this</a> article by James Meek</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-41630268157607651252013-04-07T15:32:00.000-07:002013-04-07T15:33:27.744-07:00Should fewer people be encouraged to go to university?<div align="justify">
The obvious conclusion to draw from <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/9967240/Tell-youngsters-the-truth-the-UK-needs-you-to-work-not-go-to-university.html">Allister Heath’s</a> claim that the fastest job growth over the next few years will be in occupations that that don’t require university degrees is that fewer people should be encouraged to go to university. That’s certainly the spin put on it by Heath’s sub-editor, who headlined the piece, “<span style="font-weight: normal;">Tell youngsters the truth: the UK needs you to work not go to university”. That also seems to be Heath’s view, judging from his swipe at Tony Blair’s target of getting half of school leavers into university. However, I can think of three possible objections to such an inference. The first is that we cannot depend on these projections as fixed, unchangeable constraints as policy. The second is that a skills mismatch may help drive economic efficiency. The third is that universities should be judged on their merits beyond just preparing people for jobs. </span><br />
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Economic projections are fairly dubious at the best of times, but it would be an obvious mistake to assume that nothing can be done to alter the relative growth rates of different types of jobs. After all, higher education teaching is listed among the fastest growing professions, but that is unlikely to remain the case if student numbers are significantly cut. Though he cautions against top-down planning, it is clear that Heath believes the list of policies he suggests at the end, including lower taxes, less regulation and improving infrastructure will create more graduate jobs. Thus one response to the projections is for the government to undertake the policies it believes can contribute to the development of more jobs requiring university degrees. So the first reason to continue to keep encouraging school leavers into university is because you believe that jobs can be created for them.<br />
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The second reason is to promote the meritocratic ideal that most capable person for a job should fill it. If student numbers are contracted to near enough the exact level of graduate jobs, there is no guarantee that the least academically capable will be the ones squeezed out. For one thing, risk aversion and a lack of information or social precedent mean that those from poorer backgrounds are more likely to be deterred. For another, many students do not reveal and develop their aptitudes and abilities until they are at university. Meritocracy is obviously a moral ideal – may people believe it is necessary for fairness. But it is also likely to bring about greater productivity and efficiency.</div>
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What of the ‘extra’ graduates that are unable to find jobs to match their skills? It is at least possible that they will be more productive in whatever job they end up in than someone who didn’t go to university. After all, beyond the direct technical knowledge imparted by university courses, there are a number of transferrable skills beneficial in almost any workplace, things like communication and time management. <a href="http://oecdinsights.org/2010/04/09/skilled-unskilled-too-skilled/">There is some evidence</a> that this is the case, but it has also been suggested that these advantages can be wiped out by the lack of motivation of workers who lack job satisfaction because they feel over-qualified.</div>
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Of course, even in those cases where attending university is not economically beneficial, either for the individual or the economy at large, there are still a host of reasons why we might encourage people to go to university. The social, cultural and political benefits of a university education have been discussed by <a href="http://harvardmagazine.com/2010/07/open-book-education-for-the-soul">at length</a>. It has been suggested that universities help breed a more cultured, moral and democratic society. These benefits are surely not restricted to educating those who stand to get a job at the end of the process. </div>
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More radically, for those who accept that the current level of economic development is ‘<a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/How-Much-Is-Enough-Money/dp/1590515072">enough</a>’, university may be seen as playing a role in ‘leisure smoothing’, giving young people an important period of freedom from the demands of paid employment. This fits <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jul/02/abolish-retirement">Robert Skidelsky’s vision</a> that “We shouldn't be aiming to extend the domain of work into old age, but to extend the domain of non-work into young age”. Thus universities might be seen as a sort of retirement community for the young, where they are given the opportunity to be active and social without the demands of making an economic contribution to society. </div>
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Now it might well be that these arguments are insufficient to take the sting out of Heath’s critique of the present ideology around higher education. It might be enough to show that is beneficial to have a bare minimum level of university graduates, but not enough to show that the current level is justified. That depends on the empirical facts and the weight given to the different considerations set out here. </div>
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However, I think that this debate raises a couple of very important issues for how we should think about higher education, wherever you stand. Firstly, how should the option of higher education be presented to young people? Heath’s indignation in the article comes from the belief that many university graduates are likely to feel disappointed and betrayed, believing their degrees to entitle them to better jobs than they expected. If going to university does not guarantee a graduate job, then Heath is almost certainly correct that it is wrong to mislead school leavers with false promises. Perhaps a better alternative is to present it as a calculated gamble, with a good chance of bringing about a certain type of job and lifestyle, but no guarantee. Moreover, if the economic benefits of university are smaller than we previously believed, perhaps there should be more focus on the non-economic advantages it brings? (If these messages are successful they might increase the job satisfaction of disappointed graduates, and so contribute to productivity)</div>
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The second issue this raises is the question of funding. If it turns out that much of the benefit of a university degree doesn’t accrue directly to the individual, but involve the more diffuse goods of economic efficiency through meritocracy and socio-cultural goods, this might be an argument for a greater public funding of higher education, taking more of the burden off individuals.</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-55381176022416808122013-02-10T10:15:00.000-08:002013-02-11T04:19:43.104-08:00Do academics publish too much?<div align="justify">
Inspired/provoked by an old <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/sinking-in-a-sea-of-words-1329734.html">Noel Malcolm piece</a> that’s doing the rounds, Jacob Williamson has turned his attention to the <a href="http://liberalreflections.com/2013/02/10/modern-academia/">state of modern academia</a>, and the question of whether there’s just too much of it.<br />
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Both Malcolm and Jacob trade on well-established stereotypes: academia isn’t what it once was, with the pressure on young academics to publish voluminously and make a name for themselves sending them down increasingly esoteric alleyways as they struggle for something novel to say. The standard academic article, on<br />
this view, merely restates what dozens of others have said, with a minor twist at the end.<br />
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While that picture isn’t entirely false, I think that criticism is too easy, and that there’s nothing fundamentally wrong with publishing behaviour. Jacob and Malcolm seem to have two main problems with the volume of academic literature. <br />
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The first is that it is no longer possible (as Malcolm used to do with Hobbes scholarship) to keep up with all the literature on a particular topic. As Jacob says, <em>“There’s a place for secondary texts to shed light on primary material, but this much light? It becomes blinding”. </em>But why should you expect to be able to keep on top of <em>all</em> the thoughts that a whole world’s worth of scholars are having? Surely a field where ideas come slowly, drip by drip, is stagnant, or at least lacking in energy or vibrancy? <br />
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Two points can be made in favour of the arcane academic research that I think is worthwhile but that everyone within a field shouldn’t have to wade through. The first is that however obscure an issue is, it is worth discussing as long as somebody else, <em>anybody else</em>, is interested in it. The second is that apparently dull and narrow research can actually enhance what we might think of more worthwhile and consequential research, by sparking off new ideas, or being synthesised together.<br />
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It might still be asked how scholars can find work that interests them in this mountain of work, and this is indeed a problem. But there are mechanisms – the tiered pyramid of academic journals means that following the higher prestige journals should ensure you read the things of greatest general interest. Keyword searches and citations from fellow scholars can also help. <br />
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The second objection is that quantity is prized over quality. Instead of considering a topic in depth and thinking through their ideas, academics are forced to rush through superficial research in order to move onto the next publication. Worse still, they might shirk from considering really difficult questions because they require too much of an investment of time. <br />
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I don’t think this is entirely true. After all professional success for academics is not just a function of the <em>number</em> of publications a scholar has, but also of the prestige of the journals they are published in<em>. </em>Academics do have an incentive to polish their papers and seek out novel questions because they are likely to be published in better journals. <br />
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In any case, I don’t think it’s necessarily a bad thing if academics are given a bit of a nudge to share their ideas with the rest of us before they feel they are totally perfect. That Ralph Walker and Lesley Brown (praised in Jacob’s post for their sparse publication record) should hoard their ideas and views to share only with students and immediate colleagues tries me as a shame. I’m sure most of us have experienced the benefit of being forced to have work ready for a hard deadline, rather than being left to forge it in our own time - why shouldn’t academics be similarly galvanised by the demand that they produce visible output to show for all the time they spend thinking and reading?<br />
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Moreover, I’m a bit puzzled by the assumption that just because academics are asked to write a lot, they must be lacking for things to say. I find this particularly odd coming from Jacob, who is an <a href="http://liberalreflections.com/">intimidatingly prolific blogger</a>. Academics, almost by definition, are people who have ideas. Usually lots of them. Not all of them are good, but it’s not always possible to tell how good an idea is until it is released into the world. I think that’s an experience most bloggers can relate to. So if Jacob can share four or five ideas a week on his blog, why does he feel unable to share four or five ideas <em>a year </em>in academic papers? It is the same impulse behind each – the same desire to throw ideas out into the world and see if they attract interest or provoke discussion. If it’s good enough for bloggers, why not academics?</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-36566320596992809362013-02-06T13:03:00.000-08:002013-02-06T13:04:26.118-08:00Improving Germany’s model democracy<div align="justify">
Germany has <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_system_of_Germany">one of the best electoral systems in the world</a>. If I were writing a constitution, I think only <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_system_of_New_Zealand">New Zealand</a> could serve as a better model. I’ve <a href="http://socialproblemsarelikemaths.blogspot.co.uk/2011/04/some-thoughts-on-alternative-vote.html">briefly discussed</a> the advantages of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mixed-member_proportional_representation">mixed member proportional representation</a> (MMPR) before, but here are some of the main benefits:</div>
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The question of which person you want to represent your local area and the question of which party you want to govern the country are separated.</div>
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Each voter has equal influence over the ultimate distribution of seats – unlike systems which give rise to '’swing states’ or ‘marginal constituencies’, where voters have more power</div>
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There is less incentive for tactical voting, as proportional representation ensures that votes for smaller parties are not ‘wasted’</div>
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I think these three features – less ambiguity over what people are voting for, equalising the influence of each voter, and ensuring that voters’ genuine preferences are considered – mean that MMPR is <em>more democratic</em> than other systems.<br />
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However, recent events in Germany show that it can still fall short of these lofty democratic principles. In the January 20th Lower Saxony election, it has been suggested that <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21570693-local-defeat-albeit-only-hairs-breadth-spells-trouble-angela-merkel-vincible">a number of CDU supporters voted for the FDP</a>. Why would they do this? Because the FDP is more likely to cooperate with the CDU than other parties, and it was in danger of falling short of the 5% share of the vote necessary to win any seats in parliament. It has been suggested that the general election later this year might witness a similar phenomenon.</div>
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The election was analysed mostly in terms of its implications for the fortunes of the CDU, but more troubling are its implications for democracy as a whole. CDU supporters voting FDP violates principle 3) above, that democracy should aggregate authentic, and not falsely stated preferences. Less obviously, it also violates 2) – that each vote should have equal bearing on ultimate electoral result. The CDU supporters misrepresented their preference because they believed that voting FDP would give them more influence on the distribution of seats. Voting FDP gave them more power because they had the chance not only to be the marginal voter who decided the destination of a single seat, as all other voters did, but additionally gave them the chance of being the marginal voter whose vote carried their party over the threshold, and decided a hatful of extra seats.<br />
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The flipside of the extra influence wielded by voters whose party is close to the parliamentary threshold is the disenfranchisement of those whose favoured party fails to meet the threshold – their votes effectively count for less than the rest of the electorate, raising the spectre of the ‘wasted vote’, another phenomenon MMPR is supposed to avoid.</div>
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These problems are minor niggles compared to the inequity of voting systems like the US or the UK, but the undignified scenes in Lower Saxony let the German system down. If Germany is to live up to the high democratic standards it has set itself, it would do well to lower the threshold for entry to parliament (at 5% it is <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Election_threshold">amongst the highest in the world</a>), or better yet, abolish it entirely.</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-32173341740615032732013-01-13T04:01:00.000-08:002013-01-13T08:53:42.266-08:00What Indian roads tell us about anarchy<div align="justify">
A common retort to anarchists and liberta<sup></sup>rians* is to say that if they really want to see how great life is when people get the government off their backs, they should visit Somalia, or other failed states where rule of law has effectively collapsed. Having spent the last couple of weeks in India, I might add another less extreme suggestion: if you want to see an excellent illustration of what anarchy really means, spend some time driving on the roads of Kolkata.<br />
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In what sense are Indian roads anarchic? Anarchy, <a href="http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/anarchy">as any dictionary will tell you</a>, comes from the Greek <em>an</em> (without) <em>arkhos </em>(chief or ruler). Indian drivers live up to this ideal by bowing before nobody - unconstrained by traffic lights or regulations. It is best described as a system of minimal rules – drivers more or less do what they want, when they want. Thus overtaking, undertaking, random u-turns, driving in the opposite direction to traffic, tailgating and drifting freely between lanes are commonplace. Of course, the metaphor is imperfect – the police can and do stop drivers who are excessively reckless and of course, the very infrastructure of the roads is mostly state-provided – but even if it falls short of full anarchy, the approximation is instructive (maybe closer to a libertarian <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Night-watchman_state">night watchman state</a>?).<br />
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Now while the injunction to visit Somalia is clearly meant to demonstrate the unattractiveness of anarchy, I think the story here is a bit more nuanced. Indian drivers display many of the typical libertarian virtues that are often seen as being crowded out by state regulation. Driving on Indian roads every day makes demands on your skill and ingenuity that are unimaginable in Western countries. Cars are required to manoeuvre through the tightest spaces, to slalom in between other cars, and ultimately the boldest and nimblest win. On Western roads, driving is simple and formulaic, and even if you can do something inventive and dextrous, like squeezing between the cars in front, you wouldn’t be allowed.<br />
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Another line of criticism against statism is that it ‘enervates’ or ‘emasculates’ people, who become passive and dependent on state structures, weak and pathetic sissies. Insofar as libertarians or anarchists accept this view, there is plenty again to commend Indian driving, which is, in a word, very ‘male’. <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/23/david-mitchell-women-car-insurance-sexism">According to the popular stereotype of women drivers</a>, they are too hesitant and lack spatial awareness. Both are cardinal sins on the Indian road. As I’ve already mentioned the unruliness and lack of space requires incredible precision. Moreover, an average drive involves so many games of ‘chicken’ that no driver makes any progress without a big dollop of bravado and horn-blowing. The timid, in short, are bullied off the roads.<br />
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The biggest drawback of anarchy on the roads are obvious enough – the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/world/asia/08iht-roads.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0">increased risk of accidents</a>, which are also everyday occurrences. But more than this, the feeling of insecurity takes its toll even if you avoid accident. Driving in India must be exhausting because of the constant vigilance required, given that anything could happen at any minute, new hazards round every corner. Even if you reach your destination unscathed, every other journey involves near misses, brief moments of terror – swerving at the last minute to avoid head-on collisions, or having to break suddenly as somebody fails to stop at a junction.<br />
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Less striking, but equally revealing is the sheer <em>selfishness </em>of Indian drivers. Consideration for other drivers is rare – all anybody is interested in is reaching their destination as quickly as possible, with little apparent awareness that other people’s journeys might matter too. The everyday acts of patience and courtesy you see in other countries, like staying in line in traffic, or stopping for other cars at junctions, are almost non-existent. Far more common is almost self-defeating self-centredness, such as harassing smaller vehicles in front, or rushing to impose yourself as far forward as possible instead of allowing cars in front the space to manoeuvre out of difficulties. <br />
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It would be wrong to infer from this that Indians are somehow anti-social or inconsiderate. The more plausible explanation is structural – in the absence of a system they can trust to give them security and ensure their interests are looked after, people have no choice but to sharpen their elbows and fight for themselves. And that, to me, poses a challenge to libertarians and anarchists alike.</div>
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* I fully appreciate that libertarianism and anarchism are different philosophies involving different belief systems. However, since this post discusses their common anti-statism, the differences between them are not all that relevant.</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-63081354242562131052012-11-04T14:19:00.001-08:002012-11-04T14:21:41.688-08:00Should votes be for sale?<div align="justify">
Ahead of Tuesday’s U.S. Presidential election, Stephen Levitt, <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531">citing the work of Glen Weyl</a>, has <a href="http://www.freakonomics.com/2012/10/31/an-alternative-to-democracy/">made a provocative suggestion</a> for improving the electoral process – people should be permitted to vote multiple times, paying increasingly higher fees for each additional vote. I’m attracted to this idea because it addresses one of the major drawbacks of ‘one man, one vote’, that every vote counts the same, regardless of how strong the preference expressed is. It is problematic (to me, at least – others may have different intuitions) that a vote cast by a fervent anti-Republican, who fears that a Romney victory would be <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/10/joss-whedon-mitt-romney-right-for-zombie-apocalypse/">as calamitous as a zombie apocalypse</a> should be cancelled out by the vote of someone who thinks the candidates are much the same, but that Romney just has the edge. To be clear, the objection is not that the former voter is better informed or qualified to vote, just that they feel stronger about the issues – the opinionated but ignorant would still be likely to buy plenty of votes.<br />
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A trivial example should make my intuition clear. Suppose a group of people are trying to decide what topping to get on their pizza. Four people have a weak desire to get prawn, while two have a weak desire not to get prawn. Meanwhile, one person is strongly against prawn because it will cause them to have a severe allergic reaction, and require them to go to hospital. If the decision is put to a simple majority vote, the group will opt for prawn, 4-3. Yet it seems wrong to me that the preferences of those who gain so little from having the prawn should be counted equally with the person who is allergic. For a more clearly political example, perhaps the views of those enjoying a modest tax cut should not be counted equally alongside the person who loses vital services to pay for the cuts.
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The obvious objection to the vote buying proposal, which Levitt discusses, is that it gives disproportionate political power to the rich. His response is unconvincing – he points out that such a transparent system would be better than the status quo, where the rich exert greater influence through campaign finance. But that is just an argument to reform campaign finance, not to create an alternative way to perpetuate the inequity.
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Moreover, the objection is deeper than Levitt appreciates - insofar as the vote buying scheme gives greater power to the rich, it fails in its attempt to reflect the strength of voters’ views, because it fails to account for the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marginal_utility#Diminishing_marginal_utility">law of diminishing marginal utility</a>. The logic behind the vote buying scheme, as I understand it, is that it forces people to put their money where their mouth is. In buying $50 worth of votes for the Republicans, I am showing that a Republican government is worth $50 to me. The trouble is that that $50 is a much more powerful statement when it comes from a poorer person, involving a more significant sacrifice on their part. If $50 pledged to the Republicans means giving up a meal at a nice restaurant, and person A dines at nice restaurants regularly, while for B it is an annual treat, then it is clear that B wants the Republicans to win more.
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The obvious way to reflect this would be to make voting fees progressive i.e. proportionate to income. So the richer you are, the more you have to pay to vote.
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Even with this amendment, there are two types of concern I have about the scheme. On one hand, I am sceptical as to whether this measure would be successful in achieving its own stated goal - to successfully reflect public opinion. On the other hand, I wonder whether this goal is the only desirable one to have.
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The first reason for scepticism about vote buying accurately capturing people’s real views is that it depends on people being able to provide an accurate and meaningful valuation of how much an electoral outcome is worth to them. Yet as behavioural economists such as Dan Ariely have shown, this is <a href="http://www.econlife.com/tag/reference-pricing/">something most people struggle to do without a set of reference prices for context</a> (do <em>you </em>have a clear idea, right now, how much you would be willing to pay for a certain number of votes in the next election?) This is further complicated by the fact that people wouldn’t be buying a Romney or Obama victory, but just the mere <em>possibility</em> of being decisive one way or the other.
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Even if people could accurately gauge how much their vote is worth, the market for votes might still be distorted. Just because a person is willing to pay $100 to vote for Obama, this might not fully be a reflection of their endorsement of the president. People might pay a voting fee for all sorts of reasons, just as people vote for all sorts of reasons just now – out of a sense of civic obligation, to express gratitude for the historical sacrifices of their forebears, out of a sense of power. Each of these motivations means that the amount they pay for their vote will fail to track their enthusiasm for the candidates.
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A more fundamental objection to the vote buying scheme is that it fails to understand hat voting is really about. It could be argued that it is not just about taking a snapshot of public opinion, but that it has some other function, which is subverted by vote buying. For example, political theorists have long argued that democracy has an educative value – by giving citizens the responsibility of a say in how the country is run, they are encouraged to live up to that faith by engaging with politics, developing and trusting their own judgement. If engagement with politics becomes a prerequisite of voting, then those who are not inclined to involve themselves in politics will simply shrug off this responsibility, and opt not to develop these faculties.
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Whatever you think about the vote buying proposal, it offers an illuminating challenge to the way democracy proceeds just now – does it really expose an important problem with the status quo? And if so, what is wrong with its proposed solution? In answering these questions, we get a clearer idea of the strengths and weaknesses of democracy, and why (if at all) we value it.</div>
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Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-74176812559132258552012-10-14T13:13:00.000-07:002012-10-14T13:14:31.610-07:00The difficulties of a ‘coalition of the rational’ on immigration<div align="justify">
One of the intriguing ideas to emerge from the Labour party conference earlier this month is shadow immigration minister <a href="http://www.britishfuture.org/articles/coalition-of-the-rational-could-defend-migration-says-shadow-minister/">Chris Bryant’s proposal</a> of a non-partisan ‘coalition of the rational’ in favour of immigration. The idea is attractive and interesting because it raises the ideological complexity of the issue. However, it is this very complexity that threatens the feasibility of the hope.<br />
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What Bryant appears to recognise is that immigration is an issue that cuts across the traditional left right divide, pitting libertarians against conservatives on the right, and liberals against egalitarians on the left. If those in favour of migration are to prevail, they are of course going to have to reach out to those on the other side of the spectrum. </div>
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However, it is important to recognise how difficult this diversity of opinion makes forming and maintaining such a coalition. I think it’s generally true that the inherent difficulty of coalitions stems from the fact that people <a href="http://www.smbc-comics.com/index.php?db=comics&id=2077#comic">agree on something, but do so for different reasons</a>. Immigration is unusual because of the extremely high number of different ways in which people can be in favour of it: because it promotes economic prosperity, because it helps businesses, because it reduces state regulation, because it brings cultural benefits, because it atones for historic injustices, to name but a few.</div>
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Both Bryant and Don Flynn of Migrants’ Rights Network, <a href="http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/blog/2012/10/coalition-rational-immigration-could-be-good-idea-what-do-we-need-do-make-it-happen">who has also discussed the idea</a>, appear to be too optimistic about the scale of the differences between potential coalition partners. Bryant’s moniker for the group suggests that all unprejudiced ‘rational’ people will inevitably come to the same conclusion. Meanwhile, Flynn seems to suggest that there are only two necessary conditions for the project to be a success: transcending party tribalism, and establishing the facts about immigration.</div>
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Both these views seem to suggest that a common appreciation of ‘the facts' is all we need to establish common ground on immigration. But this is a gross oversimplification of the diversity of possible positions on the topic. For a start, how would we even know what the relevant facts are? Is it about the effects of immigration on growth, unemployment, Gini coefficients, or what? Different facts will seem salient or irrelevant to different people, and I would suggest that no set of facts will convince people of all perspectives. </div>
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Even more threatening to the vision of a coalition of the rational is the fact that the same set of facts may be received in diametrically opposite ways by different people. Let’s say immigration doesn’t significantly affect the bargaining power of labour, or cause wages to fall. That might encourage egalitarians to favour immigration, but equally it could alienate pro-business types from the cause. If it were to emerge that immigrants are overwhelmingly high skilled, the news might be taken as positive by those who see immigration as an engine of growth, but it is unlikely to be cheered by cosmopolitans concerned by <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_drain">brain drain</a> in developing countries.</div>
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The point is that the very diversity of values and assumptions that make a wide pro-immigration coalition possible also make it inherently fragile, especially to new facts. And frankly, that is what makes the idea so interesting.</div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-25262973695826579002012-08-13T12:38:00.000-07:002012-08-13T12:38:23.986-07:00The Banal Nationalism of Olympic coverage<div align="justify">
The Olympics are invariably a troubling time for those wary of the excesses of patriotism and nationalism. This time around the BBC’s coverage of the games has been singled out as reflecting a narrow concern for promoting the glory of the British athletes, and failing to draw sufficient attention to the successes of other countries. The BBC’s director general, Mark Thompson is alleged to have <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/news/9465532/Dont-focus-too-heavily-on-British-success-at-the-Olympics-BBC-staff-told.html">expressed his concern</a> over the tone of the coverage, criticised as ‘<a href="http://olympics.time.com/2012/08/08/give-the-bbc-a-gold-medal-a-love-letter-to-britains-olympic-broadcaster/#ixzz23RA1NGdI">jingoistic and sentimental</a>’ by American journalists who insist “U.S. journalists would never openly root for the home team”. Robert Shrimsley nicely sums up the way that the coverage was skewed towards ‘team GB’: foreigners were only deemed worthy of attention if they are:</div>
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<em> “a) as famous as Usain Bolt or Michael Phelps; b) a great sporting discovery who will become synonymous with the London games; c) a double amputee and, most importantly, d) not in the way of a British medal hope”.</em></div>
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There seem to be two issues here. First, the BBC is being criticised for the tone of its coverage i.e. for cheering British competitors too blatantly. Second, the BBC is being criticised for its editorial decisions over which events to focus on in their coverage. The first issue doesn’t seem too hard to remedy – it just calls for commentators and presenters to have a little more self-control. The second is more fundamental – can anyone really imagine the BBC giving similar airtime to Kazakhstan’s weightlifting success, or South Korea’s shooting medals? </div>
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That this is so offers a nice example of the phenomenon Michael Billig calls ‘<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banal_nationalism">banal nationalism</a>’. The idea of banal nationalism refers to the way that apparently innocuous, everyday occurrences reinforce the fact that we live in a world divided into nations, and emphasise the significance of our national identity. Billig focuses on the subtle and insidious: “not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion”, but “the flag hanging unnoticed on a public building.” Of course, the Olympics involve plenty of conscious fervent flag waving, and it was fervent conscious flag waving that the BBC’s tone has been criticised for. But I think the banal nationalism of the BBC’s coverage, reflected in its editorial decisions, is even more interesting, not least </div>
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because it seems so obvious and inevitable that it rarely invites comment.</div>
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Banal nationalism derives its force from the numerous times a day that we are reminded of our national identity, our commonality with our compatriots, or our difference from foreigners. For example, when the British news refers to the British government as ‘<em>the </em>government’, it reinforces the idea that it is the government that British people should care about, to the exclusion of all others, whether or not the matter in question affects them personally. Similarly, the division of newspapers into ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ news reinforces the mental division between compatriots and foreigners.</div>
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We can see the banal nationalism of Olympic coverage by comparing it to the coverage of other sporting events. I don’t think that most cosmopolitans have any problem with the idea of rooting for teams in spectator sports – I think most would acknowledge that this adds to the enjoyment of the event. However, supporting a country in the Olympics is different to supporting a football team. For a start, the degree of choice that accompanies the latter decision is greatly reduced – many people choose to support teams other than their home team, for a number of reasons, including liking players in the team, or enjoying their style of play. Yet in the Olympics, it is deemed aberrant to pick and choose countries or competitors to support in this fashion. Even if you already have favourites, there is a pressure to discard them – I imagine many British supporters of Roger Federer felt compelled to abandon him in the interests of ‘team GB’. </div>
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The notion that it is aberrant not to get behind your home country is fostered by the media coverage of the games. It is presumed that you will be most interested in the fortunes of the competitors of your country, whichever sport they compete in, whether you like that sport or not. It is presumed that you only care about the backstories and narratives of your compatriots. Even if you wanted to support another country, the lack of attention given to non-British competitors gave viewers essentially two options: with us or against us. This mirrors and amplifies the banal nationalism of news coverage more generally – the assumption that you care more how the British judokas are doing reflects the assumption that you are more concerned about the British earthquake victim than those trapped beside them. </div>
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Interestingly, just as global telecommunications are generally beginning to offer an alternative to the narratives of banal nationalism, so modern technology provided the best hope of escape from the banal nationalism of the 2012 Olympics coverage. Between its interactive online and TV broadcasts, the BBC offered the chance to watch near enough every event of the games, without biased commentary or analysis, if you wanted. To take an example, one sport I really got into during the past fortnight was handball. Before 2012, I had never watched an Olympic handball match, mainly because Britain isn’t very good at handball. But since I no longer had to depend on the BBC’s guess of what I wanted to watch (Britain winning things), I was free to discover a new sport and cheer for teams that aren’t GB. Yet as I’m sure Michael Billig would insist, resistance to banal nationalism is near futile – even if we overcome a few particular instantiations, it is so powerful and pervasive that it is basically inescapable. </div>
Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-83588151993699585822012-07-25T07:57:00.001-07:002012-07-25T07:57:26.228-07:00Does Obama believe in determinism, left-libertarianism or justice as fair reciprocity?<div align="justify">
<span style="background-color: white;">Dylan Matthews has made an </span><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/20/the-philosophy-of-you-didnt-build-that/" style="background-color: white;">interesting attempt to reverse-engineer</a><span style="background-color: white;"> part of Barack Obama’s political philosophy, based on </span><a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/13/remarks-president-campaign-event-roanoke-virginia" style="background-color: white;">some remarks</a><span style="background-color: white;"> he made in Roanoke, Virginia a couple of weeks ago:</span></div>
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<em>There are a lot of wealthy, successful Americans who agree with me —because they want to give something back. They know they didn’t — look, if you’ve been successful, you didn’t get there on your own. You didn’t get there on your own. I’m always struck by people who think, well, it must be because I was just so smart. There are a lot of smart people out there. It must be because I worked harder than everybody else. Let me tell you something — there are a whole bunch of hardworking people out there.</em> </div>
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<em>If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some help. There was a great teacher somewhere in your life. Somebody helped to create this unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to thrive. Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you’ve got a business — you didn’t build that. Somebody else made that happen. The Internet didn’t get invented on its own. Government research created the Internet so that all the companies could make money off the Internet.</em></div>
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This point was immediately leapt upon and misquoted in a <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/19/mitt-romneys-misleading-attack-ad/">Romney attack ad</a>, suggesting that the Republicans at least want to present this as a key point of philosophical difference between the two presidential candidates. </div>
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Matthews sees the debate as tracking the old philosophical dispute about the existence of <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/">free will and moral desert</a>. On one hand, you have Obama sympathisers, who are sceptical about free will, and so whether people can ever be held ultimately responsible for their own success. This means that the rich cannot use the argument that they deserve their wealth to defend it against redistribution. On the other hand, those on Romney’s side of the debate are relatively credulous of the existence of free will, and so more likely to believe that the successful deserve credit for their success and deserve to keep their wealth. </div>
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Now this is certainly a plausible reading of the dispute, and I think Matthews is right to connect Obama’s comments to <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-bad-luck/">luck egalitarianism</a>, but I think this is only one of a number of ways to frame the argument. Even if it is a debate essentially about desert, the two sides might not map neatly onto the opposing sides of the free will debate. For example, someone who believes in free will might be in full agreement with the claim that the rich do not deserve full credit for their own success. All that the rejection of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_determinism">hard determinism</a> entails is that it is possible that some people are sometimes morally responsible. But of course, this does not entail that people are <em>always </em>morally responsible. Thus it is likely that many Obama sympathisers believe it is <em>possible</em> (though perhaps unlikely) for rich people to deserve their wealth, but that as a contingent fact, in the present society, most or all do not. </div>
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In any case, it is far from clear that Obama’s point is about moral desert at all. Notice that in the quote above he makes only factual claims – there are no explicitly moral arguments at all.* I think this means, whether by accident or design, that Obama’s argument has ecumenical appeal across different moral perspectives. As I see it, Obama’s argument goes something like this: </div>
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<em>Empirical Premise</em>: The rich are not solely responsible for the own success, they were dependent on others in society. </div>
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<em>Normative Premise</em>:? </div>
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<em>Conclusion</em>: Some of the wealth of rich ought to be shared with the rest of society. </div>
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Obama’s argument can be filled out with the normative premise of luck egalitarianism: that inequalities can only be justified if they result from responsible choices. This seems to be Matthews’ assumption, which explains his focus on free will – without free will, there can be no responsible choice, and so no legitimate inequality. But there are other normative premises which can serve the argument just as well. I think the two most interesting, and the ones that are most likely to capture Obama’s point, are justice as fair reciprocity and left-libertarianism. </div>
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The basic normative premise of the position I call justice as fair reciprocity is that we have special duties to other members of our society because they are necessary contributors to what John Rawls calls “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” without which we could not prosper. Elements of this position are sketched out in the work of Rawls and <a href="http://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Justice_As_Impartiality.html?id=MSxRLeWI8XAC">Brian Barry</a>. However, perhaps the clearest contemporary proponent is <a href="http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/phil267fa12/Required%20readings/Week%204/SANGIOVANNI.pdf">Andrea Sangiovanni</a>, who argues that “those who have submitted themselves to a system of laws and social rules in ways necessary to sustain our life as citizens, producers and biological beings are owed a fair return”. Notice that questions of free will, luck and desert are not immediately relevant on this account. What matters is that success was dependent on the efforts and actions of other people, and so these others are owed a share of the rewards. Whether Obama is pumping the intuition about luck or the intuition about dependence on others is unclear – I can see the argument for both. </div>
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Another thing that Obama seems to be doing in the speech is subverting orthodox libertarian notions of property. In this he echoes <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left-libertarianism#Steiner-Vallentyne_left-libertarianism">left-libertarian</a> political philosophers. As Matthews notes, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchy,_State,_and_Utopia">Robert Nozick</a> saw questions of free will and desert as irrelevant to distributive justice – he was against redistribution as he believed it to infringe individual rights. On the Nozickian view, the rich (like the basketball player Wilt Chamberlain in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchy,_State,_and_Utopia#Distributive_justice">his famous example</a>) get rich as the result of “capitalist acts between consenting adults”. That is, the free exchange of property. Left-libertarians accept the principle that there should be no restrictions on how people use their property. However, they argue for a more complicated view of who initialy owns what. On the left libertarian view, everybody has an equal claim to the natural resources of the Earth, and so anybody that has got rich by exploiting more than their fair share of these resources owes rent to the rest of humanity. Thus they combine the libertarian respect for property rights with relatively egalitarian proposals. </div>
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Obama follows the left libertarians in pointing out how supposedly self-made men like Robert Nozick’s idealised basketball player utilise the property of other people, and society in general to achieve their successes. The implication is that they owe rent in the form of redistributive taxation. Thus left libertarianism, too, can provide the normative promise Obama needs to complete his argument. In the context of current American politics, given that his argument is clearly aimed against libertarian defenders of the status quo, the left libertarian interpretation seems like a plausible reading of Obama, too. </div>
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Barack Obama’s Roanoke speech is so interesting from a philosophical point of view because of the variety of perspectives he could be appealing to. In its ambiguity it underlines the fact that effective political interventions often lack the rigour and precision of good philosophy. </div>
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*Whether normative propositions can be derived only from empirical facts remains a <a href="http://journals.sfu.ca/sss/index.php/sss/article/viewArticle/218">controversial question</a> in moral and political philosophy, but I can’t see how Obama’s argument here can work without a normative premise. </div>Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-56116560043645334662012-07-15T14:18:00.000-07:002012-07-15T14:22:16.333-07:00Should Academics Brainwash their Students? and Other Professional-Ethical Dilemmas<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Related to my </span><a href="http://socialproblemsarelikemaths.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/philosophy-and-public-engagement.html"><span style="font-family: inherit;">discussion a couple of weeks ago</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> of the
problems and responsibilities of philosophers engaging with non-academics, you might
be interested to look at </span><a href="http://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2012/addressing-poverty-and-climate-change-the-varieties-of-social-engagement/"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Simon Caney’s latest article</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (or, for that matter, the
rest of the </span><a href="http://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2012/summer-2012-issue-26-2/"><span style="font-family: inherit;">latest issue of Ethics & International Affairs</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">). Caney’s paper addresses the question of what academics can
contribute to the struggles against global poverty and climate change. I think
he makes a persuasive case that academics have a lot to offer, and there’s
little of substance that I disagree with. However, I think it’s interesting to focus
on a question that he doesn’t dwell on.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;">
<span style="font-family: Eurostile;"><o:p> </o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Caney
seems to accept that academics should be bound by a norm of ‘neutrality’ or
non-partisanship in their teaching responsibilities, and that this means that
their anti-poverty activities should be kept away from students: </span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">“</span><span style="color: #231f20; mso-bidi-font-family: AdvOT1ef757c0;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">it seems reasonable to think that academics should not use the classroom
to convert people to the goal of eradicating poverty”. It is certainly a
reasonable view, but is it <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">right</i>? I certainly
don’t think it’s <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">obvious</i> that
teaching is ‘off limits’ in this way.</span> <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: justify;">
<span style="color: #231f20; mso-bidi-font-family: AdvOT1ef757c0;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">First, it is important to see
what academics give up if they refuse to use their influence as teachers as
part of their armoury. Like all teachers, they have the capacity to strongly
direct the thoughts and opinions of their students, many of whom will go on to
be powerful and influential, especially at elite universities. For example, Caney
teaches at <st1:placename w:st="on">Magdalen</st1:placename> <st1:placetype w:st="on">College</st1:placetype>, <st1:city w:st="on"><st1:place w:st="on">Oxford</st1:place></st1:city>,
which has produced </span><a href="http://www.magd.ox.ac.uk/nested_content/listings/archived-news/news/five-members-of-the-new-cabinet-graduated-from-magdalen"><span style="font-family: inherit;">five members of the current British cabinet</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">. If he were to
persuade just a handful of his students of the significance and desirability of
action on poverty and climate change, many of them are likely to take up
positions (like senior government roles) where they can make significant
contributions to these causes.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I can see why Caney wants to rule out such influence.
There are obvious concerns about violating dignity and autonomy that arise with
the prospect of brainwashing vulnerable youths. Some people might think these
are sufficient to ensure that deviations from academic neutrality in the
classroom are always immoral.</span> <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I think this position has a couple of weaknesses. First,
not all deviations from neutrality are the same. The idea of ‘brainwashing’
suggests that students are passive receptacles, powerless to resist the
propaganda they are fed. But influence doesn’t just mean telling people what to
think. It can take the form of setting agendas. For example, tutors might
develop optional courses on climate change or global poverty. They might go a
step further, and make these courses compulsory. But notice that the influence
is procedural, not substantive: students are not told what to think, only what
to think about. They can still conclude that climate change and global poverty
are not morally problematic. Thus I don’t think that these forms of influence
are all that controversial.</span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">I guess what worries people more is the prospect that
lecturers might push certain substantive views. Again, this needn’t mean
dictating a worldview. It could just be a matter of framing questions in a
non-neutral way, or pressing objections to certain positions a little harder. </span><a href="http://socialproblemsarelikemaths.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/philosophy-and-public-engagement.html"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As I have suggested before</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, the ideal of neutrality here, merely helping others to
better understand their own positions and exerting no external influence, is rather
unrealistic. I don’t think it is psychologically possible to slough off your
biases in favour of the things you believe. </span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">But just because some non-neutrality is inevitable
doesn’t mean we should actively seek it. The most important argument for
abandoning neutrality is the potential benefits. I think most people would
accept that sometimes it is acceptable to thwart or violate autonomy if the
stakes are high enough. For example, if I believe it will prevent you from
committing a murder, most would agree it is morally justified, indeed
obligatory, to lie to you, trick you, physically restrain you. </span><a href="http://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2012/outreach-impact-collaboration-why-academics-should-join-to-stand-against-poverty/"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Thomas Pogge and Luis Cabrera argue</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> that we should see the problem of global poverty as a
calamity demanding exceptional measures – like the ones academics were willing
to take during the Second World War. If things are that serious, if the stakes
are that high, and non-neutrality can have a positive effect, then that is
surely a strong argument in its favour.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This argument is particularly interesting because I
think it might be a particular instance of a general phenomenon - a clash
between professional ethics and general moral demands. Or, to put it another
way, a contradiction between the duties attending to a certain role and duties
arising from humanity. Another interesting example might be a person who hires
new employees for their firm. While their professional obligation is to find
the best qualified applicant for the position, they might think that morally
they ought to discriminate in favour of disadvantaged applicants. Just like the
non-neutral academic, doing the right thing seems to involve behaving
unprofessionally.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Of course, there may be prudential or pragmatic reasons
to follow your professional code – in both cases, there is nothing to be gained
from losing your job. However, assume that this is not an issue – in either
case, we can imagine that detection might be impossible.</span></div>
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</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Notice that in neither case are the job or the
professional injunction themselves immoral. Indeed, we would think that
neutrality in the classroom and picking the best candidate for the job are
generally morally good things to do. This suggests that there might be
epistemic reasons to follow a generally morally good professional code rather
than your own ethics. The circumstances where departure from the professional
code is morally right are likely to be extremely rare, and most people are
likely to have difficulty judging them, so we should never depart from
professional ethics, even if we think it is the right thing to do. (This is
reminiscent of an argument for </span><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-level_utilitarianism"><span style="font-family: inherit;">split-level consequentialism</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">
</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-size: 16pt;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">I’ve only scratched the surface of the issues around
conflicts between professional and global ethics, but when the stakes are as
high as they are with global poverty and climate change, it certainly seems a
question worth pursuing.<o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-18898313320339223972012-07-07T11:16:00.000-07:002012-07-07T11:16:27.196-07:00My Experiences of the British Citizenship Test<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">With Theresa May recently announcing plans to revamp the
British citizenship test, focusing more on culture and history, and less on
practicalities, the whole citizenship process has been back in the spotlight.
Having gone through it myself, I think it might be interesting to offer my
experiences, frustrations and comments. So here’s how I found it. </span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The first thing I should probably explain is why I had to
sit the citizenship test at all. I was born in the UK to Indian parents, and
have lived in this country for all but a year of my life. This means that I
received Indian citizenship by default, but that I was always eligible to apply
for British naturalisation. If I’d had the sense to apply before I turned 18, I
wouldn’t have had to sit the test. But I put it off too long, and by the time I
finally got around to applying I was 19.</span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The first thing to say about the Life in the UK Test (the
existing ‘syllabus’) is that it is not as hard as people make out. Newspapers
and websites like to shock people with how low their scores are on sample tests
– only 14% passed in one facebook survey. But why would you expect to be able
to pass the test without any revision or preparation? The information you need
to know to pass the test is clear enough, and if you learn it, the test is
straightforward. I think you get 45 minutes to do the test – I only needed
five. In terms of difficulty, the Life in the UK Test is about as hard as the
driving theory test: if you take it seriously, it should only be a formality.</span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The big debate at the moment concerns the content of the
test. In my opinion, the “stuff on rights” and “practical info” that the Home
Office is so quick to impugn is the best bit of the test, the only information
that seems genuinely worthwhile to learn, independent of just passing the test.
I can totally see the point of making sure that new immigrants (or indeed any
citizen) know their rights as workers, how to make use of the health service,
how to buy a house, the law on things like drugs and alcohol. On the other
hand, the bits of the test that I personally found most objectionable were the
bits of trivia – like what proportion of the country is under 18, or how many
Christians there are. With these sorts of facts and figures, the impression you
get is that you are being made to jump through hoops, doing nothing more than
showing that you are willing to make some sort of an effort to win citizenship.
</span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The biggest concern I have with the process of applying
for citizenship, one that doesn’t tend to get a lot of public attention is the
sheer cost of the process. The naturalisation fee for a single adult is £851,
plus an extra £80 to pay for a citizenship ceremony. Even with discounts, that
means that an average family seeking citizenship will have to pay nearly £2500
for the privilege. This worries me because fees this high are likely to be
beyond the reach of many people, or at least put many off. The idea that you
need to be rich to be British is surely a troubling one. Then again, it’s a
principle which seems to ground a number of elements of current immigration
policy. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As it happens, I
wrote to the Home Office to give them some feedback, saying more or less what
I’ve said here. To my concerns about the content of the test, they responded
that the curriculum had been drawn up by “leading experts in the fields of
English language testing, citizenship training, employment of mi</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">grants and
community development and integration” (I wonder how that compares to the architects
of Theresa May’s curriculum?). As for my complaints about the cost of the
process, they admitted that fees are “set above cost recovery levels”, in part
to contribute “to the cost of doubling our enforcement resources” (charging
current immigrants to keep out future immigrants!). However, they also argued
that because “British Nationality brings many benefits that applicant’s [sic]
value very highly”, it is right to levy a high charge for this valuable
service. In other words, they charge high fees because they can, because
applicants are willing to pay them. If this is correct, I guess it addresses my
worry that high fees put off applicants. However, there remains a question
about whether citizenship should be such a money making exercise. </span><b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">I should probably
discuss my citizenship ‘ceremony’ too. None of the official ceremonies on offer
were convenient for me, since they all took place while I was away at
university. I couldn’t receive citizenship without taking the pledge of
allegiance, so I had to pay a little extra and have a personal ceremony,
one-on-one with the registrar. While politicians like to describe how moving
and emotional these ceremonies are, mine was at best a formality, and at worst
a bit farcical. Having vowed my loyalty to the country, we reached the stage of
proceedings where they play the national anthem. Of course, the registrar’s
office doesn’t typically have an orchestra, so we had to make do with a tinny
CD player, trying to maintain solemnity and not look each other in the eye. I’m
just glad he only insisted on the one verse.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">If I’m honest, this
last episode seems to me like an apt metaphor for my feelings towards the
citizenship process, taking something that ought to be a formality,<b> </b>trying to
inject it with some patriotic fervour, and creating something pompous,
preposterous and a bit wearing. <b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">…Please don’t deport me.</span><b style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;"> </b></div>
</span>Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com9tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-40106165216835768412012-07-06T07:41:00.001-07:002012-07-06T07:41:43.538-07:00Should the old work more, or should the young work less?<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Nat Wei, recognising the boredom and lack of meaningful
occupation experienced by many retirees, has proposed a ‘National Retirement
Service’, which would find socially and economically useful work for the
retired. His recommendation comes in the context of a project examining how the
government can help people to manage radical life transitions, like retirement.</span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Robert Skidelsky objects that this approach is
fundamentally flawed: “<span style="background: white; color: #333333; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: 8.5pt;">We shouldn't be aiming to extend the
domain of work into old age, but to extend the domain of non-work into young
age”. His argument is motivated by Keynes’ belief that as the economic problem
is solved, as we move towards a period of abundance and mechanisation, we should
work fewer hours and enjoy more leisure. It has been calculated that the
developed world passed the level of prosperity Keynes believed necessary to
usher in such a leisure society in the 1980s.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="background: white; color: #333333; mso-bidi-font-family: Arial; mso-bidi-font-size: 8.5pt;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Yet while Skidelsky presents himself in
opposition to Wei, I’m not sure how much they really disagree. I think if you
asked of each of them the question in the title of this post, they would be in
agreement <i>both </i>that the old should work more and that the young should
work less. And I think by examining this apparent disagreement we can better
see the nuances that Skidelsky’s interpretation of Keynes needs to be an
attractive proposal. </span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Wei’s
recommendation is certainly inconsistent with a crude interpretation of Keynes,
which sees work always as bad, and leisure always as good, once basic needs are
met. On this view, people work far too much already, so any idea that anybody
should work more is preposterous. Retirees have suffered enough, why burden
them further?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">But
things are clearly not that simple. Leisure can be boring or aimless, while
labour can be enjoyable, fulfilling and provide social interaction. Skidelsky
seems to appreciate this: elsewhere, he has insisted that leisure is not
idleness, but rather “activity without extrinsic end”. But surely this description
applies to the proposed national retirement service, which clearly isn’t
motivated primarily by economic considerations (the economic benefits of the
scheme seem to be more a happy side effect). Crucially, Skidelsky himself
proposes that the elderly should work three hours a week, suggesting that he
accepts that such work can be beneficial. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">So
Skidelsky, unlike the crude neo-Keynesian is not against the old working
longer. What, then ,is his disagreement with Wei? I can only imagine that he
presumes Wei does not favour the radical shortening of the working hours of the
young that he proposes alongside letting people work longer. There is no
obvious reason for this presumption. Indeed, this idea of ‘smoothing’ work and
leisure over our life cycles is entirely in the spirit of Wei’s insistence that
we should make life transitions less sharp. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">Even if this is the
case, Skidelsky might object that it is mistaken or counterproductive to extend
the working hours of the elderly without the complementary changes in the
habits of the young. I see no obvious reason why the two proposals need to come
as a package. We want the old to work more because they suffer the problem of
too much idleness. We want the young to work less because they suffer the
problem of too little leisure. Addressing one of these problems seems perfectly
possible without addressing the other. Perhaps Skidelsky’s point is about
priorities. The problem of too little leisure is worse than the problem of too
much idleness. Even if this is true, it still gives us no reason to reject
attempts to deal with the less acute problem. Though I’m sympathetic to
Skidelsky’s overall project, Wei’s proposals do not seem to be a threat to it,
and appear consistent with his desire to promote ‘leisure’ over idleness.</span></div>
</span>Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-78041218866268042612012-07-03T05:05:00.001-07:002012-07-03T05:05:11.845-07:00Philosophy and Public Engagement<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Political philosophy, almost by its
very nature, demands public engagement. There is something contradictory about
a person who espouses a certain conception of social justice, or a vision of a
good society, but is indifferent as to whether these are realised.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Amanda/Desktop/Political%20philosophy%20and%20public%20engagement.doc#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[1]<!--[endif]--></span></a>
And for political philosophers to realise such goals, they will almost
certainly need to engage non-philosophers. While it is more plausible for moral
philosophy to be a solipsistic activity – I might only want to discover what is
morally right so that <i>I </i>can put it into practice, and be indifferent as
to the morality of your behaviour – it is still likely that moral philosophers
will want to use their insight to influence non-philosophers.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://crookedtimber.org/2012/06/29/debating-applied-philosophy/">Ingrid Robeyns</a> and <a href="http://liberalreflections.com/2012/07/01/how-can-philosophy-help-the-public/">Jacob Williamson</a>
discuss the difficulties of such public engagement in a couple of recent
blogposts. In so doing they rehearse many of the issues raised by Jonathan
Wolff in his book <i><a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ethics-Public-Policy-Philosophical-Inquiry/dp/0415668530">Ethics and Public Policy</a></i>, which recounts his
experiences representing philosophy on various government advisory committees.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Amanda/Desktop/Political%20philosophy%20and%20public%20engagement.doc#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[2]<!--[endif]--></span></a>
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The central problem is this:
philosophers are regularly called upon to provide an ‘ethical perspective’’ on
certain issues. But usually there is no settled wisdom, no accepted consensus
that the philosopher can impart. They thus have two options. Either they can
present their own view as though it were fact, which would seem to be an abuse
of their position representing their discipline as a whole. Or they can present
an overview of the different positions and arguments around the issue. But without
providing any guidance on how to choose between the competing perspectives, the
philosopher is liable to confuse more than they help. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The essential problem, as both
Robeyns and Williamson recognise, is working out what exactly philosophers are
good for. In a modern democratic society, philosophers are reluctant to
proclaim themselves philosopher-kings with special access to moral truth. Even
if they did, they probably wouldn’t be taken seriously. On the other hand, what
is the point of consulting a philosopher if they are going to tell you that
your opinion is as valid as theirs?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The answer they both alight on, and
I think this is quite a standard response, is to say that the role of
philosophers is to help others work out what they think – to be ‘philosopher-guides’
rather than philosopher-kings’. Presumably this involves things like pointing
out inconsistencies, asking probing questions, and demonstrating challenging alternatives.
Philosophy, this view would seem to imply, is something that anyone can do,
coaxed on by skilled philosophers. The difference between philosophers and the
general public, on this view, is just a matter of training and experience. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">I don’t think there’s anything
fundamentally wrong with this drawing of the role of philosophers, but I think
that Robeyns and Williamson make it sound simpler than it really is. I think
the major difficulty with their view is that they underestimate how much better
philosophers are at philosophy than the general public (Which, if I am right,
is a good thing for professional philosophy, but problematic for democracy). I
don’t need to take a stand on whether this is because people who are
‘naturally’ better at philosophy are likely to become philosophers, or because
becoming good at philosophy is not a quick and straightforward process, and
requires a lot of training and practice. Either will do for my argument. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">If philosophers enjoy a significant
advantage over the laity in addressing the sort of questions they are consulted
on, this presents two possible difficulties for the Robeyns/Williamson view.
The first is that the philosopher-guide will find it hard to maintain the
neutrality their role requires. I think a lot of people who have studied
philosophy will relate to the experience of having an argument presented so
convincingly that it seems impossible to argue against, even though it is
really controversial. Given that this is what philosophers do this for a
living, isn’t it possible that philosophers will bewitch their audiences
without even intending to? After all, it is very difficult to present views you
strongly agree and disagree with as if they were the same. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Just as worrying as the possibility
that those who seek philosophers’ views will pay too much attention to their
substantive positions is the danger that they will give them too little
credence. Philosophy would be embarrassingly easy if dilettantes with only a
few days’ consideration of an issue could form positions as plausible as
professionals devoting their careers to it. If, as I presume, it is not, why
should we pretend that the half-baked ideas of non-philosophers should carry as
much weight as those of real philosophers? Why should philosophers continue to
refine views that they will never have time to properly clean up (without
turning their subjects into philosophers), when they have fully-formed ones to
offer? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">What I want to suggest here is that the role of
the philosopher-guide is one that is extremely difficult, perhaps even
impossible to carry out well. On the one hand, the philosopher risks putting
forth their own ideas too strongly. On the other, there is the danger that they
fail to provide the full benefit of their expertise. My worry is that the
middle course between these two dangers is extremely narrow indeed.
</span><div>
<!--[if !supportFootnotes]--><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br clear="all" />
</span><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<!--[endif]-->
<div id="ftn1">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Amanda/Desktop/Political%20philosophy%20and%20public%20engagement.doc#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[1]<!--[endif]--></span></a> Although
Adam Swift <a href="http://users.ox.ac.uk/~swift/The_Value_of_Philosophy.pdf">makes the valid point</a> that at least one function of the political
philosopher is ‘epistemological’: improving understanding of morality and
justice, which does not require the philosopher to change the world.</span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn2">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Amanda/Desktop/Political%20philosophy%20and%20public%20engagement.doc#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[2]<!--[endif]--></span></a> You can find
my review of Wolff’s book <a href="http://oxfordleftreview.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/olr5-online.pdf">here</a>.</span></div>
</div>
</div>Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-74375893482904867552012-06-26T06:07:00.000-07:002012-06-26T06:12:01.974-07:00Do Men Even Want to 'Have It All'?<br />
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Anne-Marie Slaughter has <a href="http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=155598678">attracted a lot of attention recently</a> for her claim that women ‘<a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-women-still-can-8217-t-have-it-all/9020/">still can’t have it all</a>’. That is, that it
is impossible for women to balance a family and a successful career without
making significant sacrifices in one, the other, or both facets of their lives.
Slaughter’s argument is an interesting one, and a fresh personal contribution
to an old question. However, I think it is at least as interesting to ask why
Slaughter’s argument was aimed at women, and indeed why this issue continues to
be seen as one which overwhelmingly concerns women. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">To oversimplify
horribly, in the Bad Old Days, there was basically a division of labour whereby
men did ‘men’s work’ (had an outside career, and provided for their families),
while women did ‘women’s work’ (ran households and reared children).<a href="file:///C:/Users/Amanda/Desktop/Anne-Marie%20Slaughter%202.doc#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference">[1]</span></a>
Now the problem is that women are trying to do both men’s and women’s work, and
failing to juggle the two. The question I am interested in is why the dilemma
is focused on women, but not men. In other words, why does there appear to be
so much less angst about men trying to maintain their traditional roles while
taking on those that used to belong to women? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">There are two big
reasons to ask whether and why similar career-family dilemmas arise for men.
The first is that if this is such a major concern for women, one which causes
such distress and heartache, it is likely to be equally consequential for men.
The second, as Slaughter rightly observes, is that any effort to improve the
status quo is likely to be greatly strengthened if it can ‘enlist’ men who face
the selfsame problems. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">As I see it, there
are three main possibilities as to how Slaughter’s argument relates to men. I
do not want to argue for any one of these, but just to discuss their implications.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The first possibility is that men face an exactly
symmetrical dilemma to women. They too, want to have it all, to be active
parents and successful careerists, but struggle to balance the two. Indeed, the
pressure on men might manifest itself in slightly different ways – instead of
being expected to have both a career and manage a family, men might feel
pressurised to play down the importance of their family life. This might
explain why there is so little tension on the surface, since the problem is
suppressed.. This is the view of Stephanie Coontz, <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/25/opinion/coontz-women-have-it-all/index.html">who insists, “It’s tough formen and women</a>”</span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The second possibility is that men do not want it ‘all’.
They may be perfectly content for women to be free to enter men’s world, but
have no interest – or at least much less interest – in the conventional tasks
of women. This view is implied by Slaughter when she says that “From years of
conversations and observations, however, I’ve come to believe that men and
women respond quite differently when problems at home force them to recognize
that their absence is hurting a child, or at least that their presence would
likely help”. That is to say, men, for whatever reason, feel no compulsion to
take on certain responsibilities previously carried out by women, and so do not
have to juggle as much as women do.</span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Most interesting, though, is the possibility that the dilemma
does not arise for men because men do not know what they are missing. That is,
they do not want to take on women’s work, but this is not because of some
natural or mutually convenient difference between the two genders. Rather, men
suffer from a kind of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_consciousness">false consciousness</a>, mistaking their true interests.
Perhaps men think that running a household is tedious or unfulfilling, when in
actual fact many men would have happier, more flourishing, more rounded lives
if they took on some of the responsibilities that women do. </span></div>
<div class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"></span><br />
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">This is particularly intriguing because it raises the
possibility that men might actually be worse off than women (I have to
emphasise: in this, and only this, dimension). Perhaps the dilemma of balancing
family and career arises only for those who experience and understand two
important human goods, and that the choices are easy only for those too stunted
to realise what is at stake. In that case, just to get men to the position
where they appreciate that there are tough choices to be made might represent
progress, and bring men back level with the women who have ploughed ahead.</span></span></div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">
</span><br />
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br clear="all" />
</span><br />
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<div id="ftn1">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="file:///C:/Users/Amanda/Desktop/Anne-Marie%20Slaughter%202.doc#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title=""><span class="MsoFootnoteReference">[1]</span></a> Take the
inverted commas around ‘men’s’ and ‘women’s’ as read from now on.</span></div>
</div>
</div>Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-53621153008194062522012-06-03T02:24:00.003-07:002012-07-15T14:23:00.284-07:00Can Global Egalitarians Defend the Welfare State?<div style="text-align: justify;">
This article is adapted from my MPhil thesis, and focuses on the more practical and empirical side of the globel egalitarian's dilemma with respect to the welfare state</div>
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Egalitarians often see the
welfare state as the obvious vehicle for their principles. But its
beneficiaries are relatively affluent by international standards.<span class="FootnoteCharacters"> </span>For example, an average household in the bottom
5% of the French income distribution will be among the richest 28% of humanity.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
From a global perspective, the welfare state redistributes from the super-rich
to the upper middle class. </div>
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</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
A number of egalitarians have
spotted this potential tension in their thought without exploring it fully. For
example, Stuart White believes that a “cluster of issues around global and
intergenerational justice is likely to become as important as the classical
debates between left and right on the justice of the welfare state”.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[2]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Similarly, Robert Goodin notes that “it is logically very difficult indeed not
to be drawn ‘beyond the welfare state’ and extend similar protections to the
needy worldwide”.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[3]</span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="mso-special-character: comment;"> </span><span style="mso-bidi-language: HI; mso-fareast-font-family: "WenQuanYi Micro Hei"; mso-fareast-language: HI;"> Meanwhile, different political
theorists have developed a strong defence of the idea that egalitarian concerns
should not be limited to nation states. This view, known as global
egalitarianism, holds that material inequalities between individuals in
different nations are morally problematic.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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This opportunity to discomfit
egalitarians has not escaped the notice of those on the right. Sam Bowman, of
the libertarian think tank The Adam Smith Institute, exploits it to bait his
ideological opponents: <o:p></o:p></div>
<span style="color: black;"></span><br />
<span style="color: black;"><em>support for a welfare state in the UK is wrongheaded even
if you believe that a welfare state is a good way of combating poverty. If
throwing money at people improves their long-run living standards, the left
should oppose a welfare state in Britain and want to direct all social
spending to the developing world</em>.</span><a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[4]</span></span></span></span></span></a><o:p></o:p><br />
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Bowman goes too far in suggesting
global egalitarians are committed to dismantling the entire welfare state –
this would inevitably lead to people in places like the UK becoming
impoverished even by global standards. The real question is whether global
egalitarians can support more generous welfare provision in<span style="mso-special-character: comment;"> </span>affluent countries (like the UK) than elsewhere. If not,
this would certainly imply dramatic cuts to Western welfare states, such as Britain’s.<o:p></o:p></div>
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In this article, I want to argue
that even if global inequality renders welfare states as generous as those of
Western countries morally unjustifiable in principle, global egalitarians still
have pragmatic reasons to defend them.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[5]</span></span></span></span></span></a> Given certain contingent facts about public
opinion in developed countries, bigger welfare states are associated with
support for measures that benefit the global poor. I take three measures in
turn – aid, trade and migration – and explain (i) how each of these contributes
to mitigating global inequality, and (ii) how each of these is associated with
larger welfare states.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Aid<o:p></o:p></b></div>
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The question of whether foreign
aid helps the global poor is so disputed that the study of aid effectiveness
has become a field in itself within development economics. It is often hard for
outsiders to make sense of the mutually contradictory findings that regularly
emanate from it,<span class="FootnoteCharacters"> <a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[6]</span></span></span></span></a></span> but there are a few general points that can be
made against aid sceptics. Firstly, though many doubt whether aid has a
positive influence, there is hardly any evidence that aid, taken as a whole,
has been harmful.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[7]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Secondly, the aid effectiveness literature takes a particularly narrow view of
success – economic growth is the most common metric. That aid has had a
positive non-economic impact independent of its direct economic effects is relatively
clear. Aid has financed successful health interventions, such as the
eradication of smallpox.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[8]</span></span></span></span></span></a> It was
instrumental in supporting the ‘green revolution’ and so feeding the world’s
poorest. It has contributed to raising education levels.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[9]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Thirdly, though it remains controversial, there is reasonable evidence to
suggest that aid has, in fact, produced economic growth.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[10]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
This result is especially strong when we account for the fact that not all aid
is intended to boost economic output.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[11]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Fourthly, there is the expectation that aid will become more effective as
practitioners gain a better understanding of what does and does not work.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[12]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Thus while much of the evidence remains inconclusive, we should still expect
global egalitarians to favour increased foreign aid.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
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A few political scientists have
explored the connection between a country’s welfare state and its contribution
to foreign aid. A common finding is that bigger welfare states tend to give
more aid.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[13]</span></span></span></span></span></a> Yet
this is insufficient to establish a causal connection – it does not show that
countries give more aid <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">because </i>they
have a bigger welfare state. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
There are a number of ways this
relationship might be explained. A third factor might cause both high welfare
expenditure and high aid donation. For example, a strong commitment to
egalitarianism would apply the same logic to domestic and international
inequality. Confidence in the effectiveness of state intervention would also
explain both. These underlying values may well be independent of existing
institutions. However, it has also been suggested that political values are
often conditioned by the norms embodied in existing institutions.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[14]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
It could be that the welfare state develops an egalitarian ethos which spreads
from the domestic sphere to the international.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[15]</span></span></span></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
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<o:p> </o:p>These static background factors
might help explain the relationship between the welfare state and foreign aid,
but there may also be dynamic factors, brought into play by changes to welfare
or aid spending. The idea that welfare and foreign aid spending could ‘crowd
each other out’ is implausible – aid never constitutes more than a tiny
proportion of government spending. Yet it is well established that citizens of
rich countries vastly overestimate how much their governments spend on foreign
aid.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[16]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
If 25% of the US government’s budget really was spent on aid, as the average
American thinks, then greater welfare spending would be much more likely to
necessitate cuts to foreign aid. Thus cutting the welfare state may well make
foreign aid seem more affordable, and therefore more popular.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
At the same time, many people
have the view that the government has obligations to look after its own people
first and foremost, and that foreign aid is only acceptable once a basic
standard of living is secured for all citizens. The global egalitarian may
disagree violently with these values, and seek to change them, but if they are
pragmatic, they must account for their existence. On this view, the less
discontent there is with the adequacy of the state’s provision for its own
citizens, the more support there will be for the state assisting foreigners. <o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
The evidence offers most support
for this last hypothesis. Using survey data, Noel and Therien find that support
for international redistribution is strongest in those countries where there is
least demand for further domestic redistribution i.e. where people are most
satisfied with existing welfare institutions.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn17;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[17]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
By contrast, the countries that most favoured more domestic redistribution
tended to be against increasing foreign aid, and were often the countries with
the least social protection. Noel and Therien suggest that this is because
inequality is less of a concern in more equal countries with a great deal of
state intervention in place.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
The extreme cases of Denmark and
France illustrate the point. Denmark, with the most generous welfare state and
lowest inequality in the OECD, showed little appetite for further
redistribution. Only 67% of respondents thought something should be done about
Danish inequality – the lowest in the sample. At the same time, 89% of Danes
thought more should be done to help the global poor. By contrast, those
proportions were almost exactly reversed in France – 91% calling for greater
domestic redistribution compared to 67% wanting more international
redistribution.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
The lesson that Noel and Therien
draw from this is that mass publics “support international redistribution more
strongly when principles of justice have been institutionalized domestically
and when poverty has been tackled at home, and less strongly in the absence of
such principles and achievements”.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn18;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[18]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Extensive domestic redistribution seems to be a popular precondition of
increasing foreign aid. Global egalitarians therefore have good reason to
defend the welfare state since it is necessary to maintaining public support
for foreign aid. <o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Trade<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
The role of trade in poverty
alleviation is another controversial issue, but most of the controversy relates
to the question of whether poor countries ought to open their economies to
world markets. However, this is not the relevant question for our purposes – we
are concerned with the policies of<span style="mso-special-character: comment;"> </span>rich countries. It is much less debatable that the
protectionism of developed countries harms the global poor. Tariffs and
subsidies keep the global poor out of lucrative markets. They depress world
prices, and increase market volatility. Worse, agriculture and textiles, where
poor countries have a comparative advantage, tend to be the most protected
markets. Moreover, these are particularly significant sectors for employment –
70% of Africans are farmers.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn19;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[19]</span></span></span></span></span></a> <o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
Various estimates have been made
of the concrete cost of maintaining these barriers. Cline suggests that the
removal of industrial country agricultural subsidies and protections could
reduce global poverty by 8%.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn20;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[20]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
It is estimated that a similar move for textiles would be worth $23.8 billion a
year to developing countries.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn21;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[21]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Farmers of just one crop in one region – cotton growers in Francophone Africa –
are believed to have lost $700 million as a result of artificially depressed
prices caused by subsidies.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn22;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[22]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
It has been suggested that “For every $3 that the EU gives Mozambique in aid,
it takes back $1 through restrictions on access to its sugar market”.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn23;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[23]</span></span></span></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
A few poor countries could be
harmed by the removal of certain trade barriers, at least in the short run. For
example, Mauritius benefits from its privileged access to the inflated prices
of the EU sugar market.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn24;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[24]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Net importers of food might be squeezed by the higher prices resulting from the
withdrawal of subsidies. However, those who stand to lose – those in cities and
relatively industrialised economies - are vastly outnumbered by, and generally
better off than, those who stand to gain.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn25;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[25]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
It is fairly safe to say, then, that<span style="mso-special-character: comment;"> </span>trade liberalisation in rich countries would help reduce
global inequality.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
Larger welfare states have been
associated with trade liberalisation for three reasons.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn26;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[26]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Firstly, they stabilise expectations. The more dependent a person is on the
market for their income – especially volatile global markets – the greater
their potential losses from free trade are likely to be, and so the more risk
averse they are likely to be. The safety net of the welfare state means that
international trade is no longer seen as a fundamental danger to our standard
of living, but as an opportunity. Secondly, the welfare state offers the
possibility of compensating the ‘losers’ of globalisation. Those whose incomes
fall can be assured of recouping some of their losses in the shape of state
benefits. Moreover, they can also be sure of receiving support, like education
and retraining. According to Peter Katzenstein, this was the conscious policy
of many European countries: Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands sought to
“complement their pursuit of liberalism in the international economy with a
strategy of domestic compensation”.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn27;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[27]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Finally, the welfare state ensures a greater role in the economy for the
government, allowing it to act as a counterweight to the vicissitudes of the
market. In a turbulent open economy, the state sector might be seen as ‘safe’,
a reliable source of employment and spending, which can step in should demand
and employment fall in the rest of the economy.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
Dani Rodrik offers empirical
support for these theoretical claims.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn28;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[28]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
He finds that more open economies have greater state expenditure, and that this
relationship is robust, independent of income, region, size, political values
and a number of other variables. Not only does the association hold
cross-sectionally, it also holds over time: countries that were more open in
1960 were likely to have a bigger state sector in the next three decades. State
spending is also related to the riskiness of trade: countries with more
volatile terms of trade tend to have bigger welfare states. Rodrik also finds
that while general government spending seemed to be the main tool in developing
countries, variation in welfare spending explained most of the variation in
openness among members of the OECD. According to his estimates, in the average
country, a 10% increase in trade volume as a proportion of GDP is associated
with an increase in welfare spending of 0.8% of GDP. There is also support for
the theory that the government acts as a safe sector of the economy – a small
increase in government spending tends to reduce income instability.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
Rodrik only suggests that the
direction of causation runs from trade openness to welfare spending, and not
the other way around. In other words, he argues that more open countries are
likely to develop bigger welfare states, but not necessarily that bigger
welfare states are likely to become more open. However, this does not seem like
an unreasonable extension of his argument and data – it is not contradicted by
anything he says. The two processes certainly seem to occur close together. If
welfare spending is seen as compensation for greater openness to trade, then it
is not unreasonable to suggest that greater spending would leave people more
willing to accept lower trade barriers, or that less spending would lead to
demands to erect higher barriers. There is no reason why compensation cannot be
provided in anticipation of openness. Indeed, this is sequence of events found
in many countries surveyed by Molana et al: government growth precedes trade
growth.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn29;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[29]</span></span></span></span></span></a> <o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
There is good reason to suspect
that a bigger welfare state encourages rich countries to lower the trade
barriers, and so remove one of the major causes of global inequality. This
gives global egalitarians further motivation to support the welfare state.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<strong><u>Migration<o:p></o:p></u></strong><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
Migration can be expected to
benefit the global poor in four ways. Firstly, there is the direct effect of
allowing relatively poor individuals access to the opportunities of rich
countries. Secondly, there are remittances - money earned by emigrants abroad and
sent back to their country of origin. These have been estimated to<span style="mso-special-character: comment;"> </span>be worth over $80 billion to developing countries, more
than they received in aid.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn30;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[30]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Thirdly, developing economies benefit from the return of migrants, having
developed skills abroad.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn31;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[31]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Finally, the prospect of emigration incentivises the acquisition of education
and skills, even among some who will not eventually get to migrate.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn32;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[32]</span></span></span></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
Against this, there is concern
about ‘brain drain’ – the idea that migration leaves poor countries worse off
because skilled professionals are lost at such a rate that it is impossible to
replace them. Some commentators have expressed scepticism about the problem of
brain drain. They argue that professionals only leave in large numbers because
there is no capacity in the economy to absorb them - they cannot find jobs at
home. Or that other factors, like religious persecution, motivate professionals
to leave.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn33;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[33]</span></span></span></span></span></a><o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
Such a sanguine view underplays
the genuine disruption caused in many countries by skilled migration. Carrington
and Detragiache estimate that “the outflow of highly educated individuals
reaches above 30 per cent in a number of countries in the Caribbean, Central
America and Africa”.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn34;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[34]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Fortunately, such extreme levels of brain drain are relatively rare. Adams finds
evidence that brain drain is a major problem in only a handful of Latin
American countries: the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica and
Mexico.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn35;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[35]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
While the negative consequences of brain drain ought not to be underplayed, it
is a serious problem for only a minority of poor countries, and so this effect
should not be enough to outweigh the massive beneficial effects of migration
for the global poor: in terms of the direct advantages conferred on the
migrants, remittances and human capital formation.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
Assuming then that greater
migration is desirable from a global egalitarian standpoint, does the welfare
state encourage or undermine the movement of people to rich countries? On the
one hand, the welfare state offers a safety net to workers who might see their
incomes compromised by foreign competition, and so encourages support for
immigration. Another salient factor is that a generous welfare state might be
seen as facilitating integration, making immigration more palatable. However,
in more generous welfare states it is possible that people will be more worried
about immigrants overburdening the system and bringing it down. <o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
Escandell and Ceobanu have tested
these hypotheses by studying the relationship between social protection and
anti-immigrant sentiment.<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn36;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[36]</span></span></span></span></span></a>
Their findings suggest merit in both of them, but pro-migration attitudes seem
the more powerful. For the unemployed, living in a larger welfare state is
associated with greater antipathy towards immigrants. This might reflect the
fact that the unemployed are uniquely vulnerable, and are most likely to view
immigrants as competitors for their benefits. However, on aggregate countries
with bigger welfare states tend to be more welcoming to immigrants. This result
holds controlling for region, income and partisanship. <o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
Migration is an important means
of global redistribution. There is evidence that stronger welfare states
encourage greater support for migration. Therefore, the global egalitarian has
another reason to support the welfare state.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Conclusion<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
This article has sought to argue
that global egalitarians have pragmatic reasons to defend the welfare state,
given that public opinion seems to demand a large welfare state as a
precondition of international redistribution. It should be emphasised that this
is only a tactical position, while<span style="mso-special-character: comment;"> </span> support for global redistribution remains uncommon. All
it suggests is that global egalitarians ought to pursue two simultaneous
strategies: on the one hand, they should promote global redistribution; on the
other, they should defend domestic redistribution. The practical difficulties
of this fight on two fronts is a subject for another day.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span></div>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<br />
<div style="mso-element: footnote-list;">
<div id="ftn1" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> <span class="FootnoteTextChar">Milanovic,
‘Global Income Inequality: What it is and Why it Matters (World Bank Policy
ResearchWorking Paper 3865), 17; see also Milanovic, ‘How Unequal Is Today’s
World?’, in his The Haves and the Have-Nots (New York: Basic Books, 2011).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn2" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn2;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[2]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> White, ‘Ethics’, in Castles
(ed.), <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare
State </i>(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 31.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn3" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn3;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[3]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Goodin, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities </i>(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 154. See also Arneson, ‘Luck
Egalitarianism: A Primer’, in Knight and Stemplowska (eds.), <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Responsibility and Distributive Justice</i>
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 46-7.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn4" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn4;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[4]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Bowman, ‘Looking at global
inequality’, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Adam Smith Institute blog, </i>June
1 2011: <</span><a href="http://www.adamsmith.org/blog/international/looking-at-global-inequality"><span style="color: blue; font-size: x-small;">http://www.adamsmith.org/blog/international/looking-at-global-inequality</span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;">
>; see also Bowman, ‘Only nationalism can justify a welfare state’, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Adam Smith Institute blog, </i>May 6 2011:
<http: blog="" only-nationalism-can-justify-a-welfare-state="" welfare="" www.adamsmith.org="">;
Rohac, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Does Inequality Matter?</i> (Adam
Smith Institute Briefing Paper). Available at: < </http:></span><a href="http://www.adamsmith.org/sites/default/files/resources/Does_Inequality_Matter_ASI.pdf"><span style="color: blue; font-size: x-small;">http://www.adamsmith.org/sites/default/files/resources/Does_Inequality_Matter_ASI.pdf</span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;">>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn5" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn5;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[5]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> I make no argument here either
for the claim that global equality is valuable, or that global egalitarians
have no principled basis to support the welfare state. On the former, See
Caney, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Justice Beyond Borders: A Global
Political Theory </i>(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). On the latter see
my MPhil Thesis, which this article is adapted from: Bhattacharya, ‘Can Global
Egalitarians Defend the Welfare State?’ (MPhil Thesis, University of Oxford,
2012).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn6" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn6;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[6]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Roodman, ‘Macro Aid
Effectiveness Research: A Guide for the Perplexed’ (<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Center for Global Development Working Paper Number 134</i>).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn7" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn7;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[7]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Hansen and Tarp, ‘Aid
Effectiveness Disputed’, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Journal of
International Development </i>12 (2000).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn8" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn8;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[8]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Levine and the What Works
Working Group, Millions Saved: Proven Successes in Global Health (Washington
D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2004); Mishra and Newhouse, ‘Does health
aid matter?’, Journal of Health Economics 28 (2009).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn9" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn9;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[9]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Dreher et al, ‘Does Aid for
Education Educate Children? Evidence from Panel Data’, World Bank Economic
Review 22 (2008).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn10" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn10;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[10]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Hansen and Tarp, op. cit.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn11" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn11;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[11]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Radelet et al, ‘Aid and Growth’, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Finance and Development </i>42 (2005).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn12" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn12;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[12]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> See, for example, Banerjee and
Amsden, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Making Aid Work </i>(London:
M.I.T. Press, 2007) and Collier and Dollar ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty
Reduction’, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">European Economic Review </i>46
(2002). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn13" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn13;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[13]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in
International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime: 1949-89 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993), 121-2; Noel, and Therien, ‘From Domestic to
International Justice: The Welfare State and Foreign Aid’, International
Organization 49 (1995), 529-30; Rieger and Leibfried, Limits to Globalization:
Welfare States and the World Economy (Oxford: Polity, 2003), 85. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn14" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn14;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[14]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> <span class="FootnoteTextChar">Rothstein,
Just Institutions Matter: the moral and political logic of the universal
welfare state(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn15" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn15;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[15]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Lumsdaine, op. cit.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn16" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn16;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[16]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">World Public Opinion.org</i>,<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"> </i>‘American
Public Vastly Overestimates Amount of U.S. Foreign Aid’, Available at: <</span><a href="http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/670.php"><span style="color: blue; font-size: x-small;">http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/670.php</span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;">>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn17" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn17;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[17]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Noel and Therien, ‘Public Opinion
and Global Justice’, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Comparative
Political Studies </i>35 (2002).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn18" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn18;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[18]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Ibid., 649.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn19" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn19;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[19]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Moss and Bannon, ‘Africa and the
Battle over Agricultural Protectionism’, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">World
Policy Journal </i>21 (2004).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn20" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn20;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[20]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Cline, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Trade Policy and Global Poverty </i>(Washington D.C.: Center for Global
Development/ Institute for International Economics, 2004), 157-68.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn21" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn21;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[21]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> <span class="FootnoteTextChar">IMF
and World Bank, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Market Access for
Developing Country Exports – Selected Issues</i> (Washington: IMF, 2002), 43.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn22" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn22;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[22]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Moss and Bannon, op. cit., 58.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn23" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn23;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[23]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Oxfam, ‘Dumping on the World: How
EU sugar policies hurt poor countries’<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">,
Oxfam Briefing Paper 61</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn24" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn24;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[24]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> <span class="FootnoteTextChar">Hoekman
et al, ‘Reducing Agricultural Tariffs versus Domestic Support: What’s More
Important for Developing Countries’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
2918.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn25" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn25;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[25]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Hoekman, op. cit.; Cline, op.
cit., 273-5.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn26" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn26;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[26]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Rieger and Liebfried, op. cit.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn27" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn27;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[27]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Katzenstein, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Small States in World Markets</i> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1985), 47.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn28" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn28;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[28]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Rodrik, ‘Why Do More Open
Economies Have Bigger Governments?’, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Journal
of Political Economy </i>106 (1998).</span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn29" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn29;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[29]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Molana et al, ‘On the Causal
Relationship between Trade-Openness and Government-Size: Evidence from OECD
Countries’, International Journal of Public Policy 7 (2011).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn30" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn30;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[30]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Adams and Page, ‘International
Migration, Remittances and Poverty in Developing Countries’, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 3179.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn31" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn31;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[31]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Constant and Massey, ‘Return
Migration by German Guestworkers: Neoclassical versus New Economic Theories’,
International Migration 40 (2002).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn32" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn32;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[32]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Stark et al, ‘A brain gain with a
brain drain’, Economics Letters 45 (1997).</span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn33" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn33;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[33]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Dowty, Closed Borders: The
Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Movement (London: Yale University Press,
1987).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn34" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn34;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[34]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Carrington and Detragiache, ‘How
Big is the Brain Drain?’, IMF Working Paper 98/102.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn35" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn35;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[35]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Adams, ‘International Migration,
Remittances and the Brain Drain’, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3069</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
<div id="ftn36" style="mso-element: footnote;">
<div class="MsoFootnoteText" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<a href="http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=6177765367520062599#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn36;" title=""><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="FootnoteCharacters"><span style="font-family: "Arial","sans-serif"; font-size: 10pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: AR-SA;"><span style="color: blue;">[36]</span></span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span> Escandell and Ceobanu,
‘Anti-Immigrant Sentiment and Welfare Regimes in Europe’, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Centre for Comparative Immigration Studies Working Paper 178</i>.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
</div>
</div>
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://oxfordleftreview.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/olr7_web.pdf">This article was originally published in the Oxford Left Review Issue 7</a>Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6177765367520062599.post-88122318254368019412012-05-22T16:06:00.002-07:002012-05-22T16:06:55.568-07:00Linguistic Concept of the Week<span style="font-family: Arial;">The
question of how to pronounce names and words from foreign languages in English is
a fraught one. One option is what is <a href="http://www.ling.ohio-state.edu/~bjoseph/publications/1992hyper.pdf">sometimes </a>called ‘foreignism’:
try to pronounce the word ‘authentically’, that is as a native speaker of the
language it comes from would say it. But this can come across as pretentious and
showy, like you’re trying to draw attention to your extraordinary knowledge of
foreign cultures. If it contradicts the pronunciation of someone earlier in the
conversation, then this is likely to be taken as a put-down and make them feel
judged. Worse still, if your pronunciation is too authentic, and the word
obscure enough, people might not even be able to understand you. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial;">On
the other hand, opting for ‘nativisation’ – pronouncing the word as if it were
English is problematic too. Some foreign words are so well established that you
would look foolish insisting on phonetic pronunciation, and might not even be
understood – for example, saying <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">croissant
</i>as ‘croy-sant’. Even if its clear what you mean, the unwillingness to make
any effort or compromise might seem arrogant or culturally insensitive. It
could send the implicit message that foreign languages are not worth knowing,
and so denigrate them.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial;">The
drawbacks of these two approaches are bad enough – see <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">The <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica%20earlymorning_peeveblogging%20/2008/10/">Economist </a></i>on Obama vs. Palin on this score. However,
there is an outcome worse than either of them, one that combines the
pretentiousness of foreignism with the ignorance of nativism, and without the brownie
points that would come from either. That possibility is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperforeignism">hyperforeignism</a></i>,
where a word is said in an ostentatiously foreign way, but fails to achieve the
authentic pronunciation. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial;">An
example of hyperforeignism that tends to irritate me is the pronunciation of <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chorizo">chorizo</a>
</i>as ‘choritso’, neither lisping the z, nor pronouncing in the English way
like at the start of ‘zoo’. This version of the word suggests that you’re pretentious
enough to try and say the word authentically, but not committed enough to
authenticity to find out whether it is Spanish, Italian or German, or to learn
the differences between those languages. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial;">The
trouble with hyperforeignisms is that they are almost impossible to avoid,
unless you are intimately familiar with every language. For example, I’m pretty
sure I’ve said </span><span style="font-family: Arial; font-size: 12pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-GB; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: EN-GB;"><a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2010/09/barack_obama?page=1">Copen-hah-gen’</a></span><span style="font-family: Arial;">. If
you’re lucky, nobody will know enough to notice, but just think: how many times
have you made a dick of yourself in this way?<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial;">Step
forward, internet. <a href="http://www.forvo.com/">Forvo </a>is an awesome pronunciation guide which aims to record
native speakers saying every word in the world. So
now you can check before you use foreign words to avoid missteps, and put your
grateful friends and family right when they inevitably slip up. <o:p></o:p></span><br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial;">Particularly
impressive is the database of names, which should be made compulsory for
football commentators. Just think, if Joe <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/teams/n/newcastle_united/7859723.stm">Kinnear</a> had known about this, Charles
N’Zogbia might still be at <st1:place w:st="on"><st1:city w:st="on">Newcastle</st1:city></st1:place>.</span><br />Aveekhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10210986823171843460noreply@blogger.com0